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ABSTRACT

Forestry

Munson, Steve. M.S. January 2000

Application of Accident Investigation Methods to Wildland Firefighting by Case Study
Method (112 p.)
Director: Ronald H. Wakimoto

Wildland firefighting is an inherently risky occupation. Firefighter entrapments,
burnovers, and fire related fatalities continue to occur on an annual basis throughout the
United States. The purpose of this thesis was to identify, from USDA Forest Service
recommendations, an accident investigation method that would be most applicable to
wildland firefighting. The most applicable method(s) would best be able to pinpoint
causal factors and identify areas where future occurrences could be reduced.
This thesis examined a single event as a case study, the 1994 South Canyon Fire.
Due to the volume of published material and its position as an extreme case, this fire was
determined to be a suitable study. The South Canyon Fire was reinvestigated utilizing
each of the U S Forest Service proposed methods. Wildland fire experts evaluated each
method according to six criteria. This determined an overall ranking used to determine
the applicable method(s).
Results suggest that two methods, The Sequential Timing and Events Process
(STEP) and Fault Tree Analysis were acceptable accident investigation techniques. Each
method had strengths (and weaknesses) in distinct areas. The third evaluated method,
Controls/Baniers Analysis was determined to be not as applicable to wildland firefighter
entrapments. Used individually or as a composite/cross reference application, these two
methods would be valuable tools in investigating wildland firefighter entrapments.
Research indicates that a composite model that utilizes the strengths of each
method would be the most valuable in determining the accident causal factors that once
identified, would lead to reduced incidents/accidents in the future. It is recommended the
future accident investigations should use both methods separately, in conjunction, and as
a third composite method in order to revalidate thesis findings. In addition, this thesis
identified the need to utilize a reliable, established accident investigation method for
wildland firefighting entrapments. An applicable method would determine causal factors
for near misses and accidents in order to track, mitigate, and identify areas in need of
revision. These areas must be identified if future firefighter entrapments are to be
reduced.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
GENERAL OVERVIEW
Wildland firefighting is an often risky occupation. The buildup of wildland fuels from
decades of fire suppression and disease/insect outbreaks has compounded the risk
firefighters have traditionally encountered. The accumulation of dead timber has
increased the available fuels and fires are becoming larger and more difficult to control.
Increasing wildland/urban interface complexities and public demands for rural firefighter
protection of property have added to the inherent risks. Since 1976, a study of published
accident reports showed 1,589 firefighters have been entrapped by fire behavior related,
life-threatening situations (Munson 1998). The National Wildfire Coordinating Group
(in USDA 1995), a collaboration of the five U.S. federal firefighting agencies and States'
representatives, defined an entrapment as; "A situation where personnel are unexpectedly
caught in a fire behavior related life-threatening position where escape routes or safety
zones are absent, inadequate, or have been compromised. An entrapment may or may not
include deployment of a fire shelter". During the period 1976 to 1998, Munson's (1998)
study showed 104 fatalities have occurred and a yearly average of 42 protective fire
shelters deployed. The traditional risks to wildland firefighters have become more varied
and complex as the incidents and accidents associated with those risks have increased.
As the risks have increased and mishaps continued, the need to identify these risks
and reduce firefighter exposure to those risks is paramount. But as Briscoe (1990) warns.
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" if absolute safety is literally accepted as having priority, with no acceptance of risk,
operation is not possible, for all activity involves some risk." This thesis suggests it is
critical to improve accident investigations to better identify firefighter risks that can be
accounted for and managed. An appropriate accident investigation system would identify
the hazards; illuminate the areas needing revision, and track progress of preventative
measures. From insights such as these management of acceptable, known risks can be
aided that can lead to increased safety and effectiveness of firefighting resources.
On July 6, 1994, 14 fatalities occurred on Storm King Mountain (The South
Canyon Fire) in Colorado. This event was a primary catalyst for wildland firefighting
agencies to reassess safety protocol throughout their respective organizations. It was
determined that "fire agencies are not routinely collecting and analyzing
data... (particularly) crucial near-miss information on the wide variety of risks inherent in
firefighting" (USDA 1995). Wilson (1989) stated that the federal firefighting agencies
have made substantial progress in areas of aviation, equipment technology, fire
prevention, and suppression tactics. The less tangible, more difficult to determine factors
have not had the same focus. Braun and Latapie (1995) mentioned that though we have
made progress in these more tangible areas little has been researched in the firefighter
environment of human and organizational factors. Federal firefighting agencies have
looked at these more physically tangible, identifiable, and correctable areas for solutions
to entrapments yet "fail to deal with a major cause of the fatalities (human error)"
(Putnam 1995). It is clear that it is time for the federal agencies to introduce operational
procedures that better elucidate those human contributing factors. This would be a critical
first step in the documenting and investigation of causes.
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In order to reduce or potentially eliminate the causes of accidents, investigations
must identify the causal factors so that preventative measures can be instituted (Mansdorf
1993). The National Safety Council (1984) defined an accident as "that occurrence in a
sequence of events, which usually produces unintended injury, death, or property
damage". The key elements in the definition were unintended results and effects. Perrow
(1984) said that this distinguished accidents from willful harm, violations, and incidents
(near misses or near serious).* As Reason suggests, violations are of particular interest, as
they become an increasing factor in the involvement of accidents (Reason 1995). He adds
that they are a deliberate deviation from safe operating procedures and "occur in a social
context and involve motivational as well as cognitive factors". Figure 1 illustrates the
relationship between accident generation, the ensuing investigative process, and the
resulting prevention measures (Diehl 1991). The figure suggests the fundamental
importance of documenting, investigating, and understanding near misses, hazards, and
incidents, as well as accidents. It graphically depicts the process of learning from
incidents and accidents by thorough investigations that identify the causal factors. Once
these factors are identified, preventative measures can be instituted to reduce the chance
of future occunences. Kenney (1993) illustrated this fundamental concept by suggesting
that for every fatal accident there were 30 major accidents and 300 recordable incidents
and some 30,000 unsafe actions or conditions.

* Though violations can sometimes be considered as purposeful, their outcome was
generally unintended. Thus recent research has included purposeful violations (with
unintended results) in a working definition of accidents (Reason 1995).
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The application of this hierarchical concept to Munson's (1998) findings on firefighter
accidents/incidents showed that for every firefighter fatality there were over 15 major
accidents (entrapments). Munson further suggests that over 240 recordable incidents may
have occuned, and that there might be over 24,000 unsafe actions and/or conditions that
so unreported. The accident reports showed that these hazardous incidents were not
routinely investigated or reported (Munson 1998). The closed loop concept of the
accident cycle illustrated the need to investigate all incidents in order to circumvent the
transition from near-miss incidents to major accidents and fatalities. The closed loop
illustrates the circular pathway that proceeds from an accident to the investigative process
to detennine the causes. Preventative measures are then instituted from the investigation
findings until another "leak" in the safety program identifies another hazard, then
incident or an accident occurs. The cycle repeats itself as loopholes found in the safety
programs are identified, then mitigated, until another loophole is breeched and an
unwanted, harmful accident occurs. The safety program is therefore a continuous
ongoing process to reduce the harmful outcomes. Therefore in order to be proactive in
accident/incident prevention an effective and comprehensive reporting and investigation
program would have to be established and maintained.

—lymwmmnt i

Figure 1. Diagram illustrating the "closed loop" accident process of accident generation to investigation to
preventative measures (Diehl 1991).

JUSTIHCATION
Accidents have been described as a process in which a perturbation "transforms a
dynamically stable activity into unintended interacting changes of state with a harmful
outcome" (Hendrick and Benner 1987). Thus a homeostatic process was interrupted by a
disruption that when unimpeded by barriers/controls or subsequent recovery efforts
resulted in unintended harm to people or property. There are many reasons to investigate
accidents such as faultfinding, fact-finding, the need to evaluate current safety programs
and to monitor prospective changes (Ferry 1988). However, the major focus of all
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accident investigations is to identify where safeguards failed so that recurrence of the
accident can be prevented.
"The wildfire suppression organization is inherently complex, both through its
internal structure and the dynamic nature of its configuration as it changes to meet the
variable complexities of the environment in which it functions"(0'Brien 1997). This
inherent complexity, the dynamic environment of wildland firefighting, and low-level
worker autonomy, exemplified the need for a specific accident investigation method that
incorporated the variable components unique to the profession. The variability of the
wildland firefighting environment and the complexities that are routine make this
profession dynamic and challenging. The structure of the front line firefighting
community is one of responsibility and accountability at the bottom where the fire
suppression work is accomplished. Thus the low-level firefighters perform autonomously
in an environment they sometimes may not be equipped to handle safely.
As a direct result of the 1994 South Canyon Fire, the five federal wildland
firefighting agencies commissioned a study by TriData Corporation (1998). This study
was to identify firefighter safety culture and concerns by conducting a survey of over
1,000 wildland firefighters. The study's goal was to investigate the underlying
organizational culture that negatively affected firefighters' safety. The questions that
were developed were used to generate insights into how firefighters did their jobs and
how their beliefs influenced how they safely performed. It did not attempt to investigate
the five national firefighting organizations themselves but focused on the underlying
firefighter safety culture. Of the 86 recommendations listed in the study, the fourth and
fifth highest priorities were directly related to wildland firefighter accident investigations.
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These priorities were determined by responses from firefighters to the survey The fourth
priority recommendation was that "the five agencies should strive to obtain a clear,
quantitative picture of the pattern of safety incidents, their causes, trends, and the lessons
learned; and to identify potential problems at the earliest time possible." The fifth priority
was to "define interagency protocols for the process and substance of investigations."
The final report of the Interagency Management Review Team (EMRT 1995) on
the South Canyon fire recommended "the USDA and DOI develop improved,
coordinated accident investigation procedures" (IMRT 1995).
Ted Putnam (1995), a member of the South Canyon Fire investigative team,
cautioned that the more tangible aspects, such as fire behavior, weather forecasting, and
fuels inventories received the primary focus by the team and that psychological and
sociological perspectives were dismissed as unimportant as possible causative factors.
Team members had expertise in fire environment factors and not in issues pertaining to
the firefighters themselves. He added that the review team's focus "fails to deal with a
major cause of the fatalities (human error).. .and calls into question the very process and
structure by which we investigate fatalities and communicate the results to the fire
community " Putnam stressed that human and organizational error in recent wildland
firefighter accidents and fatalities were common denominators and their study was
overdue.
Previously the National Wildfire Coordinating Group (1980) formed an ad hoc
committee to look at firefighter entrapments and fatalities and concluded that since the
1950's many of the same factors that were in place then as causes were still applicable.
Factors such as fire behavior, firefighter qualifications, and communications were cited
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as recurring problems. Therefore these factors were featured highly in reports. But it was
noted that these factors were continually the major focus of committee's inquiry. More in
depth and difficult to quantify issues such as organizational, sociological, and
psychological factors were not identified and investigated as causal factors. Lucas (1991)
offered insight into firefighting organization's search for accident causes when she wrote,
"The search for patterns of causes is dependent to a great extent
on the underlying perception of the causes of accidents and human
failures held by an organization. This model of accidents and errors is a
key element of an organization's "collective memory" and of its
prevailing safety culture."
Thus there is a need for investigative procedures that circumvent this circular, selfprotecting logic. Hendrick and Benner (1987) reported that repetitive accidents should be
recognized as an indication of an inadequate investigation process that has failed to
identify, evaluate, or act upon the relevant underlying causal factors.
Ferry (1988), in reviewing a variety of industrial accidents, mentioned 20 major
accident investigation methods but found no one method universally accepted. The
specific application and inherent deficiencies of each model have resulted in no
nationally accepted method for accident investigation (Hendrick and Benner 1987).
Recent national scale investigations such as the Challenger mishap have failed to identify
environmental/organizational factors using the traditional predictive analysis (Vaughan
1996a). This may have resulted from agencies having embraced accident analytical
techniques on the basis of perceived potency, current popularity, and agency investigator
preferences, rather "than on the basis of their worth at dealing meaningfully with the real
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technical issues at hand" (Clemens 1993). The inability to have obtained a universally
accepted model for all accident investigations, in addition to determining a wildland fire
investigative model that identifies possible human and organizational error, has drawn
attention to the current need.
Although many risks and hazards are associated with wildland firefighting (falling
trees, rolling rocks, sprained ankles, etc...), this study focused exclusively on each
method's applicability to wildland fire entrapment investigations. They were not only the
most publicly visible accidents but by definition, the cause of entrapments, burn fatalities,
burns injuries, and fire shelter deployments (NWCG 1997).
Currently the analytical techniques used in wildland firefighting accident
investigations have deficiencies that have not been completely addressed. This study has
undertaken the inquiry into an accident investigation method that can be applied to
wildland firefighter incidents/accidents and is best in identifying the major physical
causal factors, vectors for human error, and latent organizational causative factors within
the system.

CHAPTER 2

GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
The purpose of this thesis is to identify a comprehensive, easily utilized, and
systematic accident investigation method derived from US Forest Service (1998)
recommendations that could determine most causal factors that have led to wildland
firefighter fire burnover accidents (entrapments). The goal was to define a method that
identified causal factors. Once identified, these factors would be addressed to prevent
future accidents, reduce risk and hazard, and monitor safety programs. This method
should be; 1) directly applicable in the field environment with a minimum of formal
instruction, 2) required to be objective, proceduralized, and systematic to reduce or
eliminate investigator bias and subjective analysis, 3) discipline the investigator and
promote logical interpretation by others, and 4) reliable (testable) and document the
accident process and identify any gaps in knowledge discovered in the investigation. The
hypothesis of this thesis is that one of the three accident investigation methods derived
from current USD A Forest Service recommendations would be the most applicable to
wildland firefighting incidents/accidents using the proposed evaluation methodology. The
investigation methods would each be used to evaluate the 1994 South Canyon Fire and
the twelve "West Flank Group" fatalities and assigned ratings as to their overall ability to
meet the proposed criteria. This will be the initial test of the selected accident method
proposed for future wildland firefighting entrapments. Subsequent direct application to
ongoing accidents/incidents would increase the validity and reliability of the proposed
method.
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CHAPTER 3
PREVIOUS WORK AND PRESENT OUTLOOK
ACCIDENT METHODS OVERVIEW
Accident investigation methods have developed significantly throughout the
industrial age into the "age of the organizational accident" (Reason, 1990). As
technologies advanced and systems became more complex, many disciplines have
researched the sources of human, machine, and organizational failures that have led to
accidents. Engineers, economists, psychologists, sociologists, attorneys, insurance
companies, and industry managers were among the most prominent disciplines to actively
seek out causes of accidents. The realm of accident investigation research currently
encompasses risk management, problem solving, decision-making, human error,
organizational safety culture, safety systems, and other human, machine, and
environmental interactions. As Kjellen (1987) remarked, "The development of the
necessary means to reduce risk of accidents involves a multidisciplinary approach and a
close cooperation between theory and practice." The integration of disciplines has
facilitated a broader perspective and the ability to examine causative factors more
accurately. This collaboration will remain essential to the ongoing search for the
understanding and insights into the causes of accidents.
The perceptions of accident causes have been categorized into five main areas
according to their history, limitations, and applications. Figure 2 illustrates the various
approaches to accident investigations. Three additional approaches to accident
investigations will be presented following the five perceptions summary. They do not
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meet the five previous categories criteria due to their investigative nature. These three
approaches are Change Analysis, Managerial Failures approaches, and Multifaceted/proactive approaches. General overviews of the various methods will be included.

PERCEPTIONS OF IHE ACCIDENT PHENOMENON
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Figure 2. Diagram showing the dominant five perceptions of accident causation (Benner 1975).

Single Event Concept
Historv
The first perception of accident causation is the single event concept. This
concept focuses on the premise that accidents are caused by a single event. This simple
model exemplifies the quest for the "cause" of what occurred. The search for a scapegoat
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model exemplifies the quest for the "cause" of what occurred. The search for a scapegoat
and taking care of the scapegoat would solve the problem. This concept is the most
widely perceived and least complex. The public and media typically utilize this concept
when they ask "what caused the accident?"
Limitations
The single events concept is limited in its ability to see the accident as a process
or sequence of events in time. The factors that may contribute to the accident are not
identified or pursued due to the fact that the "real" cause is obvious and visible. Causes
that may underline human behavior are rarely determined.

Application
Current applications are primarily apparent in how the public and media view
accidents. This viewpoint is reinforced by findings such as when an airline accident was
caused by "pilot error". Police citations are another example of the perception.

Chain of Events Concept

History
The chain of events concept or domino theory was originally developed by
Heinrich (1941). The basic concept implied that accidents resulted from a sequence of
events that led to an accident. Like a row of dominos, once the sequence began each
event led to the next until an accident occurred. Intervention at any point along the events
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sequence could halt the accident process and eliminate the unwanted results. An unsafe
act starts the chain of events that began with an unsafe condition.

Limitations
This concept is limited by the linear progression characteristic of the model.
Interactions among events, contributing causes, and the duration and timing of each event
limit the identification of all causal factors.
Applications
The current use of this concept is prevalent in the legal field that attempts to
reconstruct the sequence of events that led to the accident.

Stochastic Events Concept
History
The prevailing idea behind this concept is the gathering of data and facts in order
to isolate the factors not due to chance. The model searches for variables common to all
accidents. This approach utilizes statistical comparisons to search for causal factors
present in accidents.
Limitations
The Stochastic Events approach is limited by its dependency on the data reported
by the accident investigators. The gathering of the facts supercedes any attempts at
analysis. The validity is lacking in this procedure because of investigators assumptions
about the cause bias the reporting of the facts. The procedure is undisciplined and
unstructured.
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Applications
This concept is practiced to a large degree by the USD A Forest Service. A form is
completed that has pre-identified contributing and causal factors to consider and record
(see Appendix Table B.2). The "just the facts" approach is a commonly accepted way of
investigating accidents in industry, law enforcement, and the medical profession.

Branched Tree Perception
History
The development of the logic tree perception is illustrated by the following various
accident investigation methods. The Management Oversight and Risk Tree approach
encompassed several analytical techniques in a logic tree format as integral aspects of the
investigative process. These techniques include Fault Tree analysis. The Haddon Matrix,
Barriers Analysis, and Events and Causal Factors Charting.

MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT AND RISK TREE
History
Traditional accident investigations focused on the active response to a mishap and
the identification of procedures to prevent future occurrences. The degree and intensity
of the accident dictated the intensity of the investigation response and subsequent
preventative action (Brown 1993). But as technology advanced and systems became
more complex, the consequences of accidents became increasingly unacceptable to
society and industi-y, particularly in the nuclear power industry. The nuclear industry and
similar high-risk technologies have determined that learning from accidents and even
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near misses was not an option. The consequences of accidents precluded the traditional
trial by error approach where as accidents occurred the problem was fixed subsequent to
the next mishap (termed the fly-fix-fly approach). A new approach was undertaken to
become proactive as well as reactive in accident analysis techniques to determine
possible failure points prior to occurrence. Johnson (1973a) working for the National
Safety Council and under a contract from the US Atomic Energy Commission focused on
a systems approach to accident analysis. This approach focused on the entire system in
which accidents occurred and the interaction of events within that system. Johnson
merged two basic views to focus on management responsibility in planning the context in
which accidents occur. These views, understanding the energy release process and
focusing management of that hazard on the route of its release, led Johnson to develop
the concept of "less than adequate" management decisions. This progressed to the
Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT) accident analysis tool. He said MORT
was "an analytical procedure that provides a disciplined approach for finding the causes
and contributing factors of mishaps". It entailed a very broad and detailed checklist that
facilitated the search for safety problems. It incorporated 1500 possible causes and 98
generic problems and was the initial methodology to embody management oversight into
accident causation. The Department of Energy currently employs this method as one of
its most comprehensive analytical techniques (DOE 1992). It is more generally used as a
proactive method in safety system evaluations than as an accident investigation method.
This is primarily due to the fact that it can be time consuming and intensive and due to
the nature of the nuclear industry, identifying possible loopholes in the safety system to
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eliminate hazards is more cost effective and publicly expedient than after the accident
occurs.
This concept was highly visible, easily reviewed and updated as new relevant
facts warrant, and provided structure to help reduce overlooked factors and bias. Within
the MORT system incidents were defined as inadequate barrier/controls or as failures
without consequence. Accidents resulted in adverse consequences. The MORT system
incoiporated the concept of the unwanted transfer of energy that can cause mishaps due
to inadequate barriers/controls. These barriers and controls may be physical (protective
clothing, concrete walls, etc...) or administrative (codes, standards and regulations). The
MORT system is based on two main sources of accidental losses: 1) specific job
oversights and omissions and 2) the management system factors that control the job
(Johnson 1973a). A third source he mentioned was "assumed risk". Johnson noted that
once this source was properly evaluated it could not be considered accidental in nature
since we have consciously decided to accept the risk. Integral aspects of the MORT
process are Fault Tree Analysis, Barriers Analysis and Event and Causal Factors
Charting. Each of these approaches will be subsequently explained.
Limitations
Limitations of MORT are that it can be insufficient in finding specific causes as it
designed to identify general causal areas (Gertman and Blackman 1994). These authors
do recognize its strengths in identifying more specific control and managerial factors.
Moreover, this systematic process is advantageous when system experts are not available.
Application
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Its current use as a proactive safety system analysis tool for the Department of
Energy has long standing (Briscoe 1990). It has been used exclusively as both a proactive
technique and an accident investigation method for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Fault Tree Analysis
Fault Tree Analysis is a "branched tree" approach that uses Boolean logic to work
backward from the accident event to identify causal factors. This technique is elaborated
on in more depth in the Methods section as it is one of the USDA's proposed methods for
accident investigations (USDA 1998).

Haddon Matrix
History
Haddon (1968) was a medical doctor who introduced an epidemiological
approach that is still currently used. It was a matrix of accident phases (pre-event, event,
post event) and components (agents in the accident sequence) used to describe the
accident sequence. Some investigators currently use the Haddon matrix to identify where
effective interventions may be implemented in the accident sequence.
Limitations
This approach is limited by its inability to discover more deeply rooted causal
factors. It is not as an intensive approach or as systematic as other methods.
Application
The most notable proponent of this approach is the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health. They use a Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation
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(FACE) protocol that is based on the Haddon Matrix (Casini 1998 personal
communication).

Barriers Analysis
Barriers Analysis is an accident investigation method that is an additional
component of the MORT process. The method identifies barriers/controls that are in
place to prevent accidents. These barriers may be physical and/or administrative and must
be absent, inadequate, or bypassed in order for the accident to occur. A more detailed
account of this approach will be undertaken in the methods section as this method is one
of the USD A proposed investigative tools (USDA 1998).

Events and Causal Factors Charting
History
Events and Causal Factors Charting (ECFC) graphically depicted a mishap from
beginning to end and showed the relationship between related causal factors and
conditions that influenced the accident sequence (Buys and Clark 1995). In the mid
1950's the National Safety Council developed "Dynamics of Home Accidents" in an
attempt to illustrate the multifactoral aspects of accidents (Johnson, 1973b). Figure 3
shows the suggested sequence of factors involved, including human factors,
environmental factors, and mitigating factors.
Limitations
Johnson recognized the limitations of this model in that its simplicity failed to
recognize organizational and industrial situations. He added that these situations were
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more complex and had many additional factors that were inherent in those systems.
Though relatively simple as an accident process model, the diagram was a significant
contribution to accident cause analysis and became a prototype for events chain. It
provided a systematic, standardized approach that disciplined and organized the
investigator and allowed for logical, critical review of the investigation process. Events
and Causal Factors Charting extended Johnson's work by illustrating the proceed/follow
approach that characterizes the technique in addition to the systemic and contributing
factors (Figure 4). Figure 5 illustrates how this concept could be applied to wildland
firefighting and the example of a firefighter receiving bums. Systemic and contributing
factors could be incorporated so that organizational and managerial control factors could
be linked and assessed. This addition was a major contribution to previous linear
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Figure 3. National Safety Council (1984) diagram of the "home accident
sequence and possible causal factors that can lead to an accident.

investigation methods. Interactions and relationships between factors could be easily
depicted and questioned if information was absent or questions arose. Multifaceted
problems with long or complex causal factor chains could be better analyzed by this
method (Gertman and Blackman 1994). This is because the accident sequence can be
visibly outlined and worked backward from the accident to reveal causal factors as they
lead to and interact with, each other. Banner and his associates (in Ferry 1988), while
working for the National Transportation Safety Board were innovators in the
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development of sequence diagrams and the charting processes such as ECFC. The
charting process visually allowed for evaluation of factors that sequentially led to an
accident.
Limitations
Limitations of this method include the amount of time required to conduct the
analysis and the need for investigator familiarity with the process in which the accident
occurred (Gertman and Blackman 1994). The absence of a time scale to relate
simultaneous events to each other is another limitation of the method.
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Figure 4. Event and Causal Factors Charting (ECFC) diagram showing the integration of systematic factors
with contributing factors leading to direct causal factors (Ferry 1988).
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Firefighter
Brush cured
sufficiently to
ignite

Firefighter moves onto
fireline

could not move
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into area of cured,

Brush flares up

Firefighter
burned

unburned brush

Unburned fuel
Firefighter unaware
between firefighter
of fire hazards
and fire

Firefighter training
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Figure 5. Event and Causal Factors Charting diagram of an example of the accident sequence where a
firefighter gets burned.

Multilinear Methodologies
MULTILINEAR EVENTS SEQUENCE (MES)
History
Hendrick and Benner (1987) developed a systems based multilinear sequence
method (Figure 6) to accident investigations that sought to overcome the deficiencies that
were inherent in earlier methods. Multilinear Events Sequencing (MES) was an analytical
technique initially developed by Benner (1975) while working with the National
Transportation Safety Board and a further development of Events and Causal Factors
Charting. Figure 7 illustrates the MES method using a firefighter receiving burn injuries.
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This approach incorporated a temporal consideration that recognized and accounted for
multiple events by multiple actors (or agents) that previous methods failed to take into
account. In addition, some of these events may have occurred simultaneously, this
method provided a chronological validation and event comparison format. Thus this
process provides the opportunity to discover possible unknown linking events, causes,
and contributing factors. Benner (1977) remarked that this approach provided a "method
for proving the hypothesis that differs from traditional, statistical, or experimental
approaches of the scientific method" by illuminating areas that may not be directly linked
in the causal sequence. There were two distinct differences of the MES technique that has
built upon the work of Benner and associates' (in Ferry 1988). The first was the
identification of the beginning and end of the accident sequence. The accident sequence
began when a perturbation disturbed the homeostasis (therefore this method has been
called the P-Theory in reference to a perturbation). When this stable flow of events was
interrupted by external influences the possibility of a harmful outcome increased.
Identification of the flow deviation from the normal harm-free process was necessary to
accurately pinpoint the start of the accident sequence. Identifying the end of the sequence
(the final damaging event) would allow the accident process boundaries to become
established so that the entire flow of events could be framed. The full sequence could
then be subdivided into individual events and causes.
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Figure 6. Multilinear Events Sequence (MES) diagram showing the analysis process in
reconstructing the accident sequence. Note the time scale at the bottom and the
incorporation of simultaneous conditions and/or events (Benner 1975).
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Figure 7. Multilinear Events Sequence example illustrating accident process of firefighter
receiving bums.
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The second major contribution the MES process has embodied is a more
distinct time frame than was present in antecedent linear models. The timeline has aided
investigators by structuring the search for relevant factors and events. Newly discovered
conditions or events could be easily tested and then inconsistencies and gaps in
knowledge could be more readily determined. The Civil Aeronautics Board (1962) in the
early 60's incorporated a time line when flight data recorders came into use.
Limitations
This method may be limited by its perceived complexity in developing the
framework to process all the information gathered. Underlying human factors may also
be more difficult to identify if experience in the relevant work tasks is limited.
Application
Currently the National Transportation Safety Board utilizes a similar concept as
part of a hybrid approach. Their approach involves a quantitative assessment of
engineering structures, the environment, and the time line analysis (Gertman and
Blackman 1994).

Additional Approaches
There are various other approaches to accident investigations that deserve
mention. These methods seek to determine causal factors in ways that preclude
categorizing into the previous sections. A list and short explanation follows.
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CHANGE ANALYSIS
History
The Rand Corporation (Ferry 1988) developed the concept of change analysis for
the Air Force. Their concept was to identify change in a system that would normally
operate without mishap. Something had to have changed to make the mishap possible.
That is, a disturbance to a homeostatic process was the catalyst initiating the accident
sequence. By comparing what changes occurred which resulted in a mishap to the normal
accident free task, causal factors might be identified. Such change could be directional
and exponential. It would be directional in that once change is initiated it would continue
to proceed until another change occurred. It could be exponential in that once it was
initiated the changes interact to compound the effects of mishaps. Figure 8 illustrates the
basic concept central to Change Analysis. It is considered to be a relatively quick process
for detecting obscure causes.
Limitations
An expert knowledge of normal systems operation was essential to the determination of
changes that ultimately resulted in injury or loss. This method could become very
involved when applied to complex processes (Ferry 1988).

Application
Though this approach is limited, it still is used by various private accident
investigators as well as with the US Air Force.
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Compare

Set down
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Comparable
accident-free
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Analyze differences
for effect on accident

Integrate into
investigation process

Figure 8. Change analysis diagram depicting the concept and process that compares the pre-accident
situation to the post-accident consequence. The process aids in determining the changes to the system that
had to occur for an accident to be initiated. (Ammerman 1998).

MANAGERIAL FAILURES APPROACHES
History and General Overview
Many prominent accident investigators have stated the position that accidents
have their roots in managerial and organizational failures (Fine 1976, Weaver 1973,
Grimaldi and Simonds 1984, Petersen 1975, Vaughan 1996a, 1996b). Fine (1976), for
instance, summarized this concept when he stated, "all accidents and hazards are
indicators of management failure." Vaughan (1996b) directly related that concept to the
USD A Forest Service firefighting community when she said that they are politically
vulnerable and the policy decisions that they make directly affect how operations are
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done on the ground and how lower level employees make decisions. She concluded by
saying "top decision makers are thus irrevocably responsible for safety." Just as with the
Challenger disaster, the USD A Forest Service has had warning signs of potential danger
latent within the organization prior to the South Canyon Fire. These latent conditions
brought about the transition of seemingly small, minor decisions towards what was
described as an "incremental descent into poor judgement" (Turner 1978). Reason (1991)
used the medical term "resident pathogens" to describe latent conditions in an
organization that may have laid dormant for years until a triggering mechanism broke
through the system defenses and barriers to cause an accident. He emphasized that these
resident pathogens could be identified with "adequate access and system knowledge."
One of several investigation techniques that looked more deeply into management
failures and their contribution to accidents was TOR, the Technic of Operations Review
(Weaver 1973). TOR was developed for the Wausau Insurance Companies to identify
management oversight and omissions. Findings from accident investigations were
analyzed using a four-step process. The process led investigators through a work sheet of
eight general categories. The investigative team was to identify a direct cause to initiate
the process. They then followed the factors that contributed to the direct cause that the
worksheet proposed. This identified possible contributing factors to the accident and
investigators eliminated factors that did not apply. The sequential process was used to
locate the potential problem areas within the organization. Weaver recognized that
though simple to use, TOR required an objective mid-level management team to be
effective at exposing organizational deficiencies.
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Another systems approach to accident investigations that has directly implicated
management failure was Fine's method (1976). While working for the Naval Surface
Weapons Center, he had developed an approach based on the premise that for each causal
factor identified in an investigation, the question needed to be asked, "Where did
management fail?" His technique proposed fifteen possible management failures linked
to each causal factor found in any mishap. Fine stipulated that expertise and sound
judgement by the investigators was required in order to trace all the direct and indirect
factors attributed to higher level management.

MULTI-FACETED/PROACTIVE APPROACHES
Root Cause Analysis
Root Cause Analysis (Ammerman 1998) was a method that incorporated a
process for determining a single cause. The process involved a step-by-step sequence of
previously known investigation methods. The step-by-step process was provided to
systematically direct the investigator through a series of analysis tools so that the
strengths of each were utilized toward finding the root cause. These analysis methods
were; 1) Task Analysis, 2) Change Analysis, and 3) Control Barrier Analysis, 4) Event
and Causal Factors Charting, 5) Interview Techniques, and 6) Root Cause Analysis.
Ammerman (1998) added that even though the goal was to find the root cause, this
process also identified contributing causes. He defined root cause as a causal factor that,
when eliminated, would prevent recurrence of that problem. A contributing cause may
not have directly caused the mishap but was identified as needing corrective action. The
Root Cause Analysis process built upon the sequence of analysis tools as a means to
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document, systematically organize, and logically proceed through an investigation. The
goal was to not only identify what happened, but why Ammerman (1998) stated that any
undesirable event, including those involving equipment failures and human error could be
evaluated in this manner.

Human Reliability Assessment
In the 1960's and 70's human factors specialists, while looking for the role and
causes of accidents in the work process, advanced the concept of human error in accident
causation theory. Scientists that have worked in the nuclear weapons production industry
such as Altman (1970), Chapanis (1965) Christensen (1972), Rigby (1970), Rook (1962)
and Swain (1963) focused their research on human reliability and the description of
human behavior in terms of errors. They recognized the major role human error had in
potential mishaps and worked toward identifying possible areas that could compromise
the traditional "defense-in-depth" safety backup systems. Defense in depth is the multiple
layered barriers in place for the protection of workers from hazards.
Many proactive risk assessment techniques were developed and are still being
updated and evaluated as to their relative effectiveness. These techniques were focused
on the human-machine interface and identification and quantification of human actions
on systems risk. Under the general heading of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA),
analysis techniques such as Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) and Human Error
Identification (HEI) were major evaluation methods to assess potential risks to systems
and the possible human contribution to that risk. Techniques such as Technique for
Human ERror Prediction (THERP)(Swain and Gultman 1983), HAZard and OPerability
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study (HAZOP)(Kletz 1974), Generic Error Modeling System (GEMS)(Reason 1987),
Systematic Human Error Reduction and Prediction Approach (SHERPA)(Embry 1986)
were just a few of the many prospective accident investigation methods to reduce risks
and accident rates in complex technological industries.
One method of accident analysis that was developed for the Department of
Energy to identify human interactions within complex systems used a hierarchical tree
format similar to MORT. Human SYStem interactions (HSYS)(Hill and others 1990) was
a linear process based on input-action models. The process followed a sequential path to
examine human performance factors in incident/accident occurrences. Errors could be
classified according to these five steps; 1) input detection, 2) input understanding, 3)
action selection 4) action planning, and 5) action execution. These five steps formed
branches of the hierarchical tree and have aided in both prospective and retrospective
analysis. Hill and the other investigators stated that incorporation of intra-group, intergroup, and organizational aspects were still being developed using this approach.
Analytical techniques such as HSYS that attempt to categorize human error types offer
the opportunity to identify, track, and reduce mishaps rooted in human error.
The following section details the USD A Forest Service proposed accident
investigation methods that where highlighted in the previous sections.

USDA FOREST SERVICE PROPOSED METHODS
Prior to 1998 the National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) developed
accident investigation policy for the five federal fire fighting agencies. A significant
change in investigative techniques has occurred since the 1994 South Canyon Fire
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investigation. The previous method involved a multi-methodological approach based on
traditional methods, logical deduction, common sense, and expert judgement. The
traditional analysis methods incorporated accident reconstruction, identification of unsafe
acts and conditions, trial and error fixes, statistical inference (finding variables derived
from data to determine probabilities of future occurrences), and trend forecasting (using
historical data to predict trends). The South Canyon Fire investigation (USDA,USDI,
AND USDC 1994) used a matrix approach (see Appendix Table B.2.) where
predetermined criteria were categorized as to whether they were significant contributors
to the accident, influenced the outcome, or were non-contributing (IMRT 1995). The
criteria ranged from fire behavior factors, and equipment condition to personal factors
such as training and fatigue. Every significant contributor is to have written
documentation. These criteria were effective in recognizing possible causal and
secondary factors but lacked the means to identify underlying human error (Putnam
1995). Because this checklist approach only accounted for those items on the list, no
possible human, cultural, or organizational factors were available for evaluation.
In response to the South Canyon Fire, the USD A Forest Service (1998) has
drafted new guidelines for the investigation of accidents. Based on US Army procedures
(DA-PAM-385-40 and AR 385-40 1998), the process used a "3W" approach (Ricketson
et al 1980). The "3W's" are what happened, why did it happen and what to do about it.
Figure 9 illustrates the approach. Investigations focus on assessment of elements that
revealed human, materiel, and environmental factors that caused or contributed to
accidents. The premise behind the concept is that by finding the reasons why people
make errors, materiel fails, and environmental conditions contribute to accidents, then
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similar deficiencies can be identified and reduced. Subsequently, the Forest Service
recommended four analysis techniques but none were specifically identified or suggested
for wildland firefighter incidents/accidents. The Safety Management Mishap
Investigation and Reports Guide (USDA Forest Service 1998) said that the basic premise
was to examine "why the sequence of events happened in terms of task errors, materiel
failures/malfunctions, and environmental factors." The four methods cited were Fault
Tree Analysis, Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Energy Trace Hazard
Identification (ETHI), and Sequentially Timing and Events Plotting (STEP). No
explanation was given as to why these methods were selected as analysis techniques.

WHAT
HAPPENED?
(CAUSE
FACTORS)

WHY DID IT HAPPEN?
(SYSTEM
INADEQUACIES/ROOT
CAUSES)

WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT?
(RECOMMEND
ATIONS)

-LEADER

-HUMAN
MISTAKE/ERROR
-MATERIEL
FAILURE
-ENVIRONMENTAL
FACTOR

w -TRAINING
-STDS/PROCEDURES
-SUPPORT
-INDIVIDUAL

-FIXES
-REMEDIAL
MEASURES
COUNTERMEASU
RES

Figure 9- The US Army and Department of Defense "3W's" approach to accident investigation, analysis,
and prevention (PAM 385-40 1998).
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Energy and Trace Hazard Analysis

Energy and Trace Hazard Analysis is an integral aspect of the Management
Oversight and Risk Tree process previously discussed. Gibson (1961) introduced the
concept of energy flow and barriers in the classification of accident process. This
concept focused on various vectors of potentially harmful energy sources (chemical,
kinetic, electrical, and thermal) and the barriers provided to protect from their harmful
effects (Figure 10). Identification of these barriers that have been compromised aided
development of improved or additional defenses. Gibson's search into safety analysis
looked for a more behavioral approach in that these barriers can be supervisory,
managerial, or organizational/cultural as well as physical. He stressed that these barriers
may have worker behavioral implications in that these non-physical barriers are less
visible and easier to violate without immediate adverse consequences. Administrative
barriers such as rules and regulations are much easier to transgress than physical barriers
such as containment walls or wire insulation. Examples of administrative barriers present
in the wildland firefighting profession are the 10 Standard Firefighting Orders and 18
Watch Out Situations (see Appendix Table B.2). Examples of physical barriers would be
fire shelters and personal protective equipment, such as fire resistant clothing, hard hats,
gloves, neck shrouds, and leather boots. But a physical barrier would include any
boundary of thermal protection between the firefighter and the fire itself.

37

Barrier
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Figure 10. Barrier Analysis conceptual framework where barriers/controls prevent the unwanted
transfer of energy from a hazard to a valued target. These barriers may be physical (protective
clothing) or administrative(salety rules)(EG&G Idaho 1985).

Haddon (1973) further developed the unwanted transfer of energy concept and its
control by various measures or barriers. Again, sources of energy were derived from
chemical, kinetic, electrical, and thermal vectors. He specified ten types of barriers to the
accidental transfer of energy. These barriers are intended to:
1 ) Prevent the marshaling of potential energy-do not produce or
manufacture the energy (e.g. Prevent probabilities of fire ignitions).
2) Reduce the amount of potential energy-voltages, fuel storage (e.g.
Reduce fuels).
3) Prevent the release of potential energy—strength of energy containment
(e.g. Reduce fire probability under adverse weather conditions or
increase separation distance of fire personnel).

38

4) Modify the rate of release of potential energy-slow down burning
rate, speed (e.g. Cool fire with water, dirt).
5) Separate in space and time the source of potential energy-electric
lines out of reach, (e.g. Escape route to safety zone or indirect attack).
6) Interpose material barriers from the potential energy-Insulation,
guards, (e.g. Personal protective clothing).
7) Modify shock concentration surfaces of the energy-Round off and
make soft (Probably not applicable to bumover incidents).
8) Strengthen the target of the potential energy—Earthquake-proof
structures (e.g. Fire shelters).
9) Limit the damage of potential energy—Prompt signals and action,
sprinklers (e.g. Lookouts).
10) Rehabilitate persons and objects that may come in contact with the
potential energy (e.g. Discipline and/or retrain)
An analysis of an accident sequence can be initiated by investigating a) the energy
source(s) and their paths, b) the people or objects that are vulnerable to the unwanted
energy flow, c) the baniers and controls that were designed to protect vulnerable people
and objects, and finally, d) the precursor events of energy transfers and barrier failures
that lead to the accident. The ten types of barriers outlined above show examples of their
applicability to firefighting operations. Barriers Analysis also allows safety personnel or
investigators to examine the sequence of events/causes that may have led up to the
accident. Am merman (1998) provided a worksheet to document and track accident
consequences, barriers in place and the reasons for barrier failure in any accident where
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there was loss of property or injury. The Department of Energy (1992) expanded on the
barriers concept by implementing a six-step process that identified the barriers, found the
ones that failed, identified how they failed, then why, where barriers may have prevented
the accident and finally validated the findings from the information learned. This process
was incorporated into this thesis and documented using DOE's recommended worksheet
(see Appendix Table A.l).
The Earner Analysis method is currently one aspect of the accident investigation
process (and MORT process) utilized by the Department of Energy (Trost and Nertney
1985, Buys and Clark 1995) and proposed by the USDA Forest Service (USDA Forest
Service 1998). Though recommended, this method has not been utilized as of this date by
the Forest Service. Though the concepts and processes are identical. Barriers Analysis is
also called Energy Trace Hazard Identification, Control Barriers Analysis, and similar
variations of those names.
Barrier Analysis is limited by requiring investigators to have a good working
knowledge of the task process in order to properly identify and evaluate barriers/controls
and possible avenues of bairier penetration (Gertman and Blackman 1994). Since barriers
may be administrative, managerial, and supervisory, as well as physical, a competent
overall knowledge of the work process is essential.

Fault Tree Analysis

Heinrich (1941) developed the methodology that preceded and formed the
basis for Fault Tree Analysis. He illustrated the linear sequence of factors in accident
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causation by using a domino theory. The theory stated that a disturbance that caused any
one of the five identified components of the sequence to fail would set off a chain-ofevents that led to an accident. The five in the sequence were 1 ) ancestry and social
environment, 2) conditions and fault of person, 3) unsafe act, 4) unsafe condition and 5)
injury. He showed that by intervention at any point along the sequence an accident/injury
could be prevented. This theory has been modified and updated (Baker 1953, Marcum
1978, Heinrich et al 1980), and has wide applicability in current automobile accident and
law enforcement investigations.
Similar linear sequence models such as Critical Path Analysis (CPA), Gantt
Charts, and Program Evaluation Research Task (PERT), were initially used in the 1950's
and 60's as planning tools (Lockyer 1964). Though many names were given to their
process they were veiy similar in their goals and methods. They provided a graphical
display of activities linked to events by arrows in order to plan complex projects. The
process illustrated a tlow (path) from one task sequence to the next and incorporated time
frames and interrelationships between tasks. Projects could then be analyzed by task, the
amount of time needed for each segment and the relationship a task may have with
another task. These methods offered an effective means of project planning, costs
analysis, and time frame considerations by visually outlining the task process (Lockyer
1964). These processes also provided the means to better understand the
inteiTelationships between and among tasks. This logical depiction of process flow
related directly to analyzing an accident sequence and the precursor events.
In the 1960's Bell Laboratories expanded upon the linear chain of events concept
through missile system safety.

They arranged events in a flow chart that used a
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proceed/follow logic pattern. Their concept, Fault Tree Analysis (Figure 11), is generally
credited to Watson (1971).

Figure 12 illustrates the fault tree concept as applied to a

hypothetical accident where a wildland firefighter was burned. This analysis concept
helped provide a sense of management by objectives by identifying unwanted events (the
top event) and then systematically and sequentially determining the precursor events. The
objective is the top event and the identification of the preceding causal factors aid in the
management achievement of that objective. Watson's Fault Tree Analysis investigation
methodology provided a visible, easily understood and defendable format (1971). The
methodology extended the linear chain of events into a "branched events chains" concept
through the use of "and/or" logic gates. It uses basic Boolean logic in a hierarchical tree
format. Other Boolean terms such as "not" are not used in Fault Tree Analysis. For
example, "C" can only occur when both "A" and "B" occur. If two or more events are
required for a cause to happen then an "and" symbol is used. Another possibility is when
only one of the factors need be present. For "C" to occur, then "A" or "B" occurred. If
only one event of two or more are necessary then an "or" gate is used. The "top event" is
the unwanted result of the accident and causal factors branch out below leading to it. The
downward sequence is continued until the root causes are found or the tree cannot be
further developed. This technique, according to Benner (1975), "contributed a powerful
tool for the investigation of accidents - both historical and postulated." Accidents could
be investigated or reinvestigated in the search for causal factors utilizing this method. It
assisted in illuminating areas that may have previously been overlooked by other means.
Numerous approaches to determining accident causal factor using "branched events
chains" reflected the discipline of the investigations employing it; thus medical doctors
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used an epidemiological approach (agent/host/environment), while psychologists focused
on human factors.
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Figure 11. Fault Tree diagram illustrating a typical failure process, symbols used,
and the logic sequence leading to an undesired event, a dark room (in Ferry 1988).
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Figure 12. Fault Tree diagram illustrating the deductive process using an example of a sequence of
events in which a firefighter receives bums.

One key limitation of Fault Tree Analysis is the inability to model time sequences
that are concurrent and interactive (Hendrick and Benner 1987). Brown (1993) added that
only one event could be analyzed at a time and thus primarily applicable to catastrophic
events. Benner (1975) cited similar deficiencies, most notably that charting analysis
methods focus on a single undesired event and provided no means to indicate the
chronological relationships (and the subsequent concurrent interrelationships) of events.
Another limitation is the restriction inherent in the method whereby causes must be either
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successes or failures and degrees of each are not accounted for (Tulsiani and others
1990).

Sequential Timing And Events Plotting
Evaluations of the multilinear systems safety approach have led to a procedure
developed by Hendrick and Benner (1987). Multilinear systems approaches view
accidents as multiple avenues of causal factors that react to previous factors and may
interact with others throughout the system to ultimately lead to an accident. The
Sequentially Timed and Events Plotting (STEP) procedure was a comprehensive
approach to reconstructing an accident. It was based primarily on Events and Causal
Factors Charting and Multilinear Events Sequencing previously cited. The key
component of the accident reconstruction process was the STEP worksheet (see
Appendix Figures A.3). The worksheet was the documentation that provided structure,
visibility, and organization to data gathering and analysis. It illustrated the beginning and
end of the accident sequence along columns that represented time. The rows of the
worksheet listed the actors, either people or things, which acted to produce the harmful
outcome. Each actor performed one action, termed an event, that when displayed along a
timeline visually showed the interactions among actors and events. The process
subsequently accommodated events that occurred at the same time. Each event was
represented by a block diagram that displayed the time the event occurred, the
information source, the actor and the action (Figure 13). These event building blocks
allowed investigators to visually recreate the mental motion picture and determine gaps.
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By performing three tests, the accuracy and validity of the entire worksheet could
be assessed. Test number one is the column test to make sure the events sequence is
accurate. Test two is the row test for completeness. The third test is the necessary and
sufficient test to validate what events were necessary and sufficient to have caused the
next event(s). These tests also helped investigators look for knowledge that may be
lacking. This extended the cause and effect linear model into one that took into account
contributing causes and conditions that occurred simultaneously. Interruptions and
questionable cause and effect relationships could be more readily recognized and
investigated than previous logic diagram techniques.
The STEP concept was substantially based on the development of a "mental
motion picture" of the accident sequence as a reconstructive tool. The building blocks of
actors and their actions were the "frames" in which to recreate the "motion picture".
Figure 14 illustrates the incorporation of building blocks onto the STEP worksheet in
order to visualize the accident "motion picture". Hendrick and others (1987) proposed an
additional benefit to the STEP methodology. They added that the identification and
utilization of an applicable decision-making model along with concrete terminology to
specifically classify human error would expand the capabilities of STEP. The decision
making model could provide the basis for the development of a data base to track and
analyze human error that was unique to an occupation, task, and industry. In this thesis,
the STEP method is applied without the human error classification since it is currently
unrefined.
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Figure 13. STEP CARD used to consolidate information used to reconstruct an accident sequence.
(Hendrick and Benner 1987).

EVENTS IN TIME...

STEP Building
Block (Actor 2)

Figure 14. STEP Worksheet illustrating the placement of individual building blocks (of actors and
events) their influence and interaction with one another, and relative sequence in time (Hendrick and
Benner 1987).

CHAPTER 4
METHODS
STUDY APPROACH
The application of an accident investigation method to wildland firefighting was
evaluated by examining a single case, a portion of the South Canyon Fire. Case studies
have provided an established, valuable method of study. Yin (1989) stated that the case
study is a "frequent mode of thesis and dissertation research in... psychology, sociology,
political science, anthropology, history and economics". The frequent use of case studies
is due to the fact that they allow close in-depth analysis and understanding of specific
cases, aid in understanding unique realms of inquiry, and provide insight into cases that
could not be duplicated experimentally. Reason (1990) has stated that when sufficient
evidence regarding a single case is available, "we are able to study the interaction of the
various causal factors over an extended time scale in a way that would be difficult to
achieve by other means." This case study allows for an evaluation of an extreme incident
that could not be replicated by experimental means. Reason added that case studies have
taught us "disasters are veiy rarely the product of a single monumental blunder." He
further states that human-made disasters are generally the result of accumulating,
apparently negligible consequences that compound to contribute to the undesired result.
In reference to this specific case study, Prineville Hot Shot Superintendent Tom Shepard
(South Canyon Fire survivor) echoed Reason when he said, "There was a whole series of
events and circumstances, a change in any one of those would have produced a different
outcome"(Long and Hoover 1994).
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Case studies, as applied to this thesis, involve the investigation into a single social
phenomenon, in this study, the 1994 South Canyon fatality fire. Case studies can generate
innovative new interpretations and concepts by selectively analyzing a single case
(Feagin and others 1991). As laboratory experiments lend themselves to low-level
generalizations, case studies can provide the means to generalize to theory (Yin 1989).
This approach allows for a broader explanation of how cases that are deviant can provide
insight into accident causation and investigative techniques.
Yin (1989) mentioned four procedures in order to construct case studies. The first
is asking the right question you would like answered, what is the theory you are
attempting to clarify and investigate? Data collection is the second phase and must
attempt to include as many sources as possible in order to triangulate (come at the
important data for various sides). This provides construct validity to the research. Data
analysis is the third phase and techniques such as pattern matching, explanation building,
and a logic model are techniques used to establish a chain of evidence that provides
validity to the researcher's conclusions. This phase provides internal validity. External
validity is accomplished by entertaining rival explanations of the proposed hypothesis
throughout the study. The last phase is the reporting of the findings and conclusions in
which data in the form of tables, spreadsheets, statistical outputs, interviews, coded
worksheets, etc. provide the evidence necessary to defend the conclusions. Reliability is
established through the case study protocol developed in the research design phase.
Three accident investigation methods were selected for evaluation. These methods
are the "units of analysis". The method of investigation is under examination in this
thesis, not the fire itself. As previously mentioned, three methods. Energy and Trace
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Hazard Identification (also called Energy Trace Hazard Analysis, Control/Barrier
Analysis or Barrier Analysis), Fault Tree Analysis and STEP were recommended by the
US Forest Service as their newly established preferred methods (USDA Forest Service
1998). Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) was a fourth recommended method
but was not integrated into the thesis. This was due to its primary quantitative application
to hardware component failure rates in systems (DOE 1992, USDA Forest Service 1998).
That particular method utilizes experimentally derived rates of failure in various
components to obtain an overall failure rate. Benner (1985) rated these three methods
highest among 14 methods he evaluated from 17 federal agencies. Benner utilized 10
criteria derived from OSHA statutes and policy to rate these methods. Five of these
criteria were utilized in this thesis as Benner's other criteria were directly applicable to
satisfying OSHA's mission and not directly to the accident methodology. Benner's
additional criteria were, a) satisfying, b) functional, c) direct, d) noncausal, and e)
definitive. Criteria utilized in this thesis were selected because they satisfied standard
assessments of reliability and validation (Benner 1985, Feagin and others 1991).
Benner's reasoning behind the high ratings was that they were focused on accident
causation as a process where events occurred in a logical sequence. These "events
process" methods showed the interactions between actors and events and the influence of
contributing factors on the accident sequence.

LIMITATIONS AND GENERALEABILITY

One caveat Reason (1990) mentioned is the limited information that is available
from past accident investigations and the tendency of documentation to be "digitized" as
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opposed to an original, more complex and continuous nature of "analog" events. Past
accident reports lack the information that was potentially available. The broader, richer,
and more complex possibilities of the original account can be compromised in the written
foiTn. Though this thesis is constrained by this limitation, the systematic process of each
method can not only identify contributing and causal factors but gaps in knowledge that
need further inquiry. The identification of these gaps is a positive tool for improvement
of future investigative procedures and could identify areas that a particular method takes
into account or, conversely, fails to recognize. Thus the advantages and disadvantages of
each method can be determined. One method may be more applicable to specific causal
areas whereas another may be stronger in another. Determining the strengths and
weaknesses of each method as applied to wildland firefighting entrapments could provide
the theoretical framework for applications to subsequent accidents/incident
investigations. The method determined most applicable would also provide possibilities
for additional research to overcome any inadequacies inherent in that method.
The reliability and validation procedures of this case study approach, as applied to
wildland firefighter entrapments, was an important factor in selecting this method of
analysis. Each method used has been previously utilized in various industries and was
found to be valuable tools in accident cause determination (Benner 1985). Therefore they
have been found valid and reliable in other high risk occupations. This thesis utilized
inductive reasoning where specific observations lead to theory generalization. Yin (1989)
stated that "case studies, like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical propositions,
and not to populations or universes and... the investigator's goal is to expand and
generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical
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generalization)". Just as statistics from experiments that were derived from population
samples are generalized to a larger population, case studies can similarly generalize to a
larger theory of the investigated process itself. As in any scientific experiment,
replication of the results in other case studies can offer additional information and
validation into the phenomenon studied. By examining an extreme case, generalizing to
less complex, less extreme cases could be applicable, reliable, and valid.
In addition, case studies can provide invaluable modes of understanding (Yin
1989). Insights gained from their analysis can be incorporated into theories of error
production. Case studies can expand on principles that "can reasonably be expected to
reduce either the occurrence of errors or their damaging consequences" (Reason 1990).
The study of individual cases can provide understanding into the breadth and scope of
human performance capabilities that laboratory environments could not emulate. It would
be impractical (and unethical) to attempt to replicate extreme circumstances that model
the real world in a laboratory environment. The ability to investigate and learn from these
extremes in human capabilities, high risk decision making processes, and problem
solving under life threatening situations can only be studied in their complete context
from case studies.

CASE STUDY BACKGROUND
Background knowledge of the South Canyon Fire studied in this thesis can
provide insight into the work processes, complex interactions, and the accident sequence
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itself. This is a general overview from the fire's inception to the time of the accident. A
more complete account can be found in the published literature previously cited.
This fatality fire provided the detailed, published documentation to compare and
contrast the proposed methods of analysis. It was inarguably the most documented
wildland firefighter fatality fire investigated up until that time. On July 2, 1994 seven
miles west of Glenwood Springs, Colorado, lightning started the South Canyon Fire. Due
to the large number of fires that burned on BLM's Grand Junction District at that time,
the fire was monitored until July 4 when increased public concern and resource
availability lead to the decision to begin suppression of the fire (IMRT 1994). Local
resources made up of a seven-person BLM/ Forest Service crew arrived and began
suppression activities early on July 5. This group was supervised by Butch Blanco who
was designated the Incident Commander for the fire. Eight smokejumpers with Don
Mackey as "jumper-in-charge" reinforced the local crew later that evening. When
mechanical problems disabled their chainsaws the BLM/Forest Service crew hiked back
down to Interstate 70 to do repairs and return the following morning. The smokejumper
crew worked on the fire till early morning on the 6* when the rolling of burning logs and
pine cones made line construction too hazardous in the dark. They continued line
construction on the southeast flank after dawn (Figure 15). Later that morning, eight
additional smokejumpers parachuted to the fire with jumper-in-charge Eric Hipke. Hipke
turned over the jumper-in-charge responsibility to Dale Longanecker who then became a
line scout. A helispot was cleared near the fire and transport by helicopter of the twenty
members of the Prineville Interagency Hotshot Crew began. Superintendent Tom
Shepard led the Hotshots. After a 0930 reconnaissance helicopter flight by Blanco and
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Mackey was made to determine suppression tactics, Mackey instructed the smokejumpers
to begin line construction down the west flank from the north. They refused the
assignment due to the fire activity at that time, but when the 8 additional jumpers arrived,
line construction began. They were reinforced by nine of the Prineville Hotshots upon
their arrival at 12.30. After eating at the "Lunch Spot" at approximately 14:00, some
smokejumpers worked to the south while the Prineville group of nine and several
smokejumpers worked the West Flank. This group has been designated the "West Flank
Group" (Butler et al 1998). The remaining Prineville Hotshots and the BLM/FS crew
worked on the Main Ridge improving fireline and monitoring for spot fires. At
approximately 15:20 that afternoon, a dry cold front passed the fire area producing
increased winds and fire spread and intensity escalated. At 16:00 the fire had crossed the
bottom of the west drainage and spread up the west side. The firefighters on the west
flank were ordered "to get out of there" by Shepard (IMRT 1994, Butler and others
1998). The fire then spotted back across to the east side beneath retreating firefighters on
the west flank fireline. The fire moved uphill in dense Gam bel oak vegetation and
overran firefighters attempting to escape up to the Main Ridge on the west flank. Of the
forty-nine firefighters assigned to the fire, twelve perished on the west flank and two
helitack personnel perished when they were overran northwest of the fire. A third group,
called the Lunch Spot Ridge group (Butler et al 1998), deployed fire shelters and
survived. A fourth group, called the Main Ridge group, escaped down the east drainage.
An initial investigative report was published by the USD A, USDI, and USDC (1994) and
followed up by two reports by the Incident Management Review Team (IMRT
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1994,1995). The Occupational Safety and Health Administration also investigated the
South Canyon Fire and published a report (OSHA 1995).

If*

.;

Figure 15. Photograph of South Canyon Fire area and selected points where major events
occurred. Photograph by Jim Kautz USDA Forest Service. Top of photo is Southeast.

Case Study Application

This case study has investigated a major subunit of the South Canyon Fire, the
twelve fatalities that occuned on the West Flank of the fire. It was selected due to its
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the consequences (Butler et al 1998). The other three subunits were the "Main Ridge
Group", the "Lunch Spot Group", and the "Helitack Group". Accident investigators and
safety professionals have agreed that the difference between a near miss (or near serious)
incident and an accident is mainly a matter of luck or adequate recovery efforts (whether
intentional or not)(van der Schaff et al. 1991). Therefore by examination of the accident
subunit the applicability of the resulting accident method to wildland firefighting
incidents/accidents ranging from relatively minor fire burnovers to severe consequences
may be transferable. When safety barriers are breeched in occupations where the risk may
be high, numerous controls must be circumvented. When the consequences are extreme
and complex (e.g. fatalities) then the most stringent barriers must be eluded in order for
an accident to occur. Therefore less serious accidents (near misses, etc) which have
violated less stringent controls can be investigated with corresponding success.
Inferences drawn from an accident investigation method could be applied to the range of
failures from near misses to fatality accidents. This thesis would be an "instance of a
broader phenomenon, as part of a larger set of parallel instances." (Feagin et al 1991).

ANALYSIS
The following section outlines the operations used in evaluating the three
investigation methods. This section illustrates the three methods of validation, construct,
internal, and external, and the case study protocol as a means of reliability. This section
includes the criteria selected to aid in determining the most applicable method and the
operational procedures utilized. In addition, techniques were included to measure the
consistency and reliability of the results.
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Criteria and Procedures
Criteria have been established in order to determine each method's applicability
to wildland fire entrapment situations. These criteria were; is the method 1) realistic, 2)
comprehensive, 3) systematic, 4) consistent, 5) visible, 6) simple and easy to learn?
Criteria were derived from the only known source of accident investigation methods'
evaluations (Benner 1985) and were adapted to this case study. The criteria will be used
by independent judges to evaluate the three methods. The judges were given a copy of
the methods section in this thesis in order to understand the procedures and criteria.
These ideal criteria are defined as follows:
1 ) Realistic - this method should produce a model that represents the sequential,
concurrent, and interactive nature of the events flow. The model must also
represent the events interaction with time. The model must also allow for the
real-world representation of the events and the inherent risks involved in the work
process. Does the method represent real people operating in the real world? In
other words, does it have ecological validity? Does this method reconstruct the
accident sequence as it would have had to occur, both in time and in space?
2) Comprehensive - the method must provide for the identification of the
beginning and end of the accident sequence. It must describe the entire accident
sequence so that no gaps in understanding exist. Does this particular method
appear to miss contributing and/or root causes to the accident or does it seem to
allow for all factors (organizational, managerial, supervisory, environmental.
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human factors) to be incorporated and analyzed? In other words does it have
content validity?
3) Systematic - the method must provide a logical, disciplined approach that
allows for mutual support of all investigation members. As information becomes
available to the accident investigation, does this method allow for easy
incorporation into the ongoing inquiry? Is it an easy to follow, step-by-step
approach, that forces investigators to maintain that approach and not deviate as
facts become uncovered? Does it exhibit face validity? Does the method's
approach reduce bias that may be introduced by the investigators?
4) Consistent - the method must be consistent and testable based on all available
information. If someone else were to utilize this method would they be able to
produce the same results? Is it reliable?
5) Visible - the method must discover and present events and interactions
throughout the accident sequence that would be easy to comprehend for others
and provide documentation as evidence. Gaps in the knowledge or understanding
and any assumptions must be identified. The investigation process must be
relevant and credible. When someone who knows nothing about the analysis
method was to look over the analysis, they would find it easy to see how the
results were obtained. Interpretation would be minimal for an uniformed person to
understand the accident process.
6) Easy to learn - Due to the fact that most investigators may not have had
extensive formal accident investigation training, the method must be relatively
easy to learn, understand, and implement without extensive formal training or
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qualifications. Forest Service investigators are not primarily investigators but
occupy other positions. The accident investigation method should be able to be
learned in a training seminar of less than 1 week duration. This criterion may not
be as critical to the evaluation of the "best" method as the other criteria because
an overall best method may require more lengthy training. This criterion will be
evaluated on equal standing with the other five and then eliminated from
evaluation so as to better understand the implications.

The judges utilized a ranking system of these six criteria and assigned a ranking
of 0,1,or 2 to each criterion. They applied each set of criteria to evaluate each of the three
methods. A "0" meant that they did not meet this criterion. A "1" meant that they
addressed the criteria but not completely and improvement would be required. A "2"
meant that they fully met the criteria. This rating is a summated scale. The narrow span
of the scale was used to reduce indecisiveness on the part of the subject matter experts,
since they were not accident investigation experts. The 3-point scale allowed them to be
more exact in their determinations of how each method satisfied that particular criterion.
The rating scale also follows Benner's (1985) approach in that until a more
comprehensive scale is developed to better differentiate levels of compliance to the
criterion, a more simple direct measurement scale is appropriate. This rating process
limited the possible more precise evaluation of each method but provided a basis for
determining accident investigation methods that would require further testing in field
applications. Since each criterion is independent of the others no weighing factor was
applied. Again this follows Benner's (1985) format he derived from government statute
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and "did not conflict with one another." Each criterion was evaluated as having no more
importance to determining an appropriate accident investigation method than another.
Each was a valuable determinant to the overall assessment.
Five subject matter experts evaluated the three analysis techniques by rating how
well they satisfied each criterion. They examined the three methods utilized in the
author's reinvestigation of the S. Canyon Fire. This was a purposeful sampling of
occupational experts. Since no known list of these experts exists, they were chosen from
the first available. These experts were not accident investigation experts but wildland
firefighting experts. This was utilized to most accurately emulate real world situations
where investigators may have some investigative experience but their primary occupation
and training is not in these techniques. Each expert had at least fifteen years of wildland
fire suppression experience and is at a minimum qualified at the Strike Team Leader
level. The Forest Service considers experts as those who teach a particular subject, so the
author's classification can be considered conservative. This definition of expert was
developed by the author and is a source of author bias but reduced by the conservative
definition. To reduce evaluator bias, none of the subject matter experts consulted or
coordinated with each other in rating the methods. Preconceived impressions about the
South Canyon Fire and its possible causes may have introduced evaluator bias into the
ratings. Since they were evaluating the investigation methods and not the reinvestigation
of the fire, bias should have been reduced.
The author (also qualified as an expert) reinvestigated the South Canyon Fire
using the three methods so that the Subject Matter Experts could see how the methods
could be used. They then rated the each method using the criteria previously mentioned
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and rating how well each method met those criteria. It was stressed that they were to
evaluate the methods themselves and not how well I did used each method. The subject
matter expert's evaluation package included a summary explanation of each proposed
method compiled from the standard reference literature (DOE 1992, Ferry 1988,
Hendrick and Benner 1987). The package also included the author's output worksheets of
his reinvestigation of the South Canyon Fire (see Appendix Figures A.l, A.2, A.3, and
Table A.l). A copy of the study approach along with the author's results of the
reinvestigation using the three methods was included. The subject matter expert's
familiarity and knowledge of the basics of the S. Canyon Fire was assumed.
The overall totals for each accident investigation method were assessed to
determine the best method. In addition, the degree of agreement among evaluators
(interrater reliability) was utilized to assist in the determination of the most applicable
method and each method's individual strengths according to each criterion. Comments by
subject matter experts were solicited to obtain individual impressions and evaluations that
may have not been covered in the assessment process. As no additional literature was
found on the importance of the selected evaluation criteria towards accident investigation
methods (and methodologies), the study used a variation of Benner's (1985) criteria,
methods and equal-weight approach. No evaluator or criterion was given more weight
than another. This aided in strengthening the internal validity.
As a measure of the reliability between evaluators, percentage agreement was
calculated. This was done to access the degree of reliability among scores assigned to
each criterion. The higher the agreement the more valid the ratings are. Also an additional
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measure was computed using the index of Perreault and Leigh (1989). Their index is
computed using the following formula:
Ir = {[(F/N) - l/k)][k/k - 1)]

, where F is the frequency of agreements

between the evaluators, N is the total number of judgements, and k is the number
of categories.
Multivariate techniques to interrelater reliability were not conducted as the number of
evaluators and criteria were considered too small and would not constitute any
meaningful insight.
The case study analysis used the pattern matching logic to strengthen and
validate the results (Yin 1989). By comparing patterns predicted for each method, that is,
that they meet selected criteria and are applicable to wildland firefighting, and matching
with the predicted patterns (that they fully meet, or not meet the criterion), evidence is
accumulated in determination of a most applicable method. Yin stated that though
empirically based, the comparison of patterns and their ability to coincide with
established criteria can "strengthen its internal validity". The development of empirical,
logically tested evidence would provide internal validation to the case study analysis
process.
As mentioned previously, this system of evaluating accidental investigation
methods followed an earlier attempt by Benner (1985). He acknowledged the
assumptions and bias inherent in such an evaluation. The systematic accident method
process, documentation of each event sequence, and independent consultation of subject
matter experts reduced the bias. The five evaluators had no prior experience with any
accident investigation method so there was minimal pre-study bias as to which method
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may be more applicable. Although the author used each method to reinvestigate the South
Canyon fire, each evaluator was instructed to use the reinvestigation as a means to
evaluate the methods and not to evaluate how well the author performed the analysis. The
author is not an accident investigator, so the way the method can be used to investigate an
accident is critical not the way the author used it. The experts were presented the tools to
understand the process and application of each method, and the author's working
example illustrating how it can be used. They were instructed to analyze how well each
method did, and possibility could, fulfill each criterion.

CHAPTER 5
RESULTS
The results of the subject matter experts' evaluations are presented in Table 1.
The STEP accident investigation method received the highest overall rating with a score
of 52 total out of a possible 60 (87%). The Fault Tree Analysis method received a rating
of 51 (85%). The Control/Barriers Analysis method received a rating of 42 (70%).
For each criterion evaluated by the experts, the STEP analysis method was rated
highest along with Control/Barriers as the most realistic with a score of 9 out of a
possible 10 (90%). It was rated as the most comprehensive (100%), most consistent
(100%), and tied with Fault Tree Analysis as the easiest to use (90%). Fault Tree
Analysis was rated as the most systematic method with a score of 12 (100%), the most
visible (90%), and tied as the easiest to use (90%). Two of the evaluators rated Fault Tree
Analysis highest in overall applicability across all criteria to wildland firefighter
entrapments, two rated STEP highest, and one rated both STEP and Fault Tree Analysis
as equal. No evaluator rated Control/Barrier Analysis highest.
The majority of reliability indexes and percentage agreements calculated were
acceptable within the limits prescribed by Perreault and Leigh (1989) and
Kassarjian(1977). They reported that indexes above .85 were very good and below .80
may require réévaluation. The total agreement among evaluators for STEP and the six
criterion used to evaluate this method was 80% (0.84, Perreault and Leigh's (1989)
reliability index). The Fault Tree Analysis method was 83% (0.86 reliability index). For
the Control/Barriers method agreement was 75% (0.79 reliability index). The overall
reliability of evaluator agreement for all three methods was 80% as a percentage and 0.84
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when computed using the reliability index. These agreement indexes showed that
consensus among evaluators as to their ratings was acceptable.
In reference to each criterion evaluated, the Control/Barriers and STEP method
were the highest rated and most agreed upon methods for being realistic. Fault Tree
Analysis did not achieve an acceptable agreement index (.63). In evaluating
comprehensiveness, the STEP method rated highest for both overall score (10) and
agreement (1.0, PeiTeault and Leigh's reliability index) and the other two methods had
high agreement on a value of "1" (addressed the criterion but needed improvement). In
rating each method as systematic. Fault Tree Analysis rated highest in both score and
agreement. Agreement was high that Control/Barriers rated a "1" in inadequately meeting
that criterion. The STEP method did not receive an acceptable overall agreement index
(.63). Consistency was highest using STEP with Fault Tree Analysis and Control/Barriers
second. Agreement on the scores for all three methods was acceptable at above the .80
level. Visibility was highest using Fault Tree Analysis and of acceptable agreement.
Agreement was high that STEP and Control/Barriers were not adequately visible in their
application. Both the STEP method and Fault Tree Analysis were rated equally high as to
ease of use and evaluator agreement was high. Although it received a lower score than
the other methods, there was not acceptable agreement that C/B was easy (or not easy) to
use. When the criterion "easy to use" was eliminated from evaluation, overall percentage
agreement scores were Fault Tree Analysis (84%), STEP (80%), and Control/Barriers
(70%) and therefore did not alter the findings.
Evaluator's comments were solicited as to the applicability of each method
beyond what each criterion addressed. One evaluator liked the way Fault Tree Analysis
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visually presented complex events and the way it showed accidents as a chain-of-events
as opposed to a single random occurrence. Another commented on the way Fault Tree
Analysis led backwards from the accident itself to logically uncover causes or reveal
questions that may have been otherwise overlooked. They thought that this method might
be better at uncovering managerial/administrative latent factors contributing to the
incident than the other two methods. In contrast, one evaluator responded that the STEP
method appeared more stringent in revealing underlying human causal factors. They
commented that STEP (and Control/Barriers Analysis) provided an approach that was
more likely to distinguish more abstract human factors from hard factual data
considerations and therefore be better at raising questions into human error causes. The
STEP method was cited by one evaluator as the approach that most visually displayed the
actor/action sequence of events and identified knowledge gaps in the sequence. All
evaluators expressed concern that Control/Barriers Analysis was inadequate in
determining causal factors when applied to wildland firefighting. It had strengths in
identifying needed and/or compromised barriers at an administrative level but the
dynamic and highly variable aspect of the firefighting environment made its application
to investigations inadequate. They commented that it did not appear to be an adequate
tool to probe deeper into possible human error (and administrative/managerial
oversights). The method was good at defining what control or barrier failed but not why it
failed.
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Table 1. Results of subject matter expert's evaluation of the three investigation methods,
A score of "0" meant that the criterion was not met, a score of "1" meant that this
accident method had the ability to meet that criterion with some improvement. A score of
"2" meant that the criterion was fully met. Consult text for
definitions.

Evaluator A
Criteria

Realistic
Comprehensive
Systematic
Consistent
Visible
Easy to use
Total
SCORE

Realistic
Comprehensive
Systematic
Consistent
Visible
Easy to use
Total
SCORE

FAULT TREE
C D E
Total Reliability % Agreement
8
0.63
60
1 2 2 2
6
0.84
80
1 2 1 1
100
10
1
2 2 2 2
9
0.84
80
2 1 2 2
9
0.84
80
2 2 2 2
9
0.84
80
2 1 2 2
10 10 11 11
51

B

1
1
2
2
1
2
9

2 2
1 1
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
7 11

BARRIERS
Total Reliability % Agreement
0.84
9
80
1 2 2
0.84
80
0 1 1
4
0.84
80
1 1 1
7
9
0.84
80
2 2 2
0.84
6
80
1 1 1
0.63
60
7
2 1 1
7 8 8
42
ST EP

Realistic
Comprehensive
Systematic
Consistent
Visible
Easy to use
Total
SCORE
TOTALS

2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2
1 2
1 2
10 12

1
2
2
2
1
2
10

2
2
1
2
1
2
10

Total Reliability % Agreement
9
0.84
80
2
10
2
1
100
8
0.63
60
1
10
100
1
2
0.84
8
80
1
0.84
9
80
2
10
52
0.84
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS

The results of this inquiry into an accident investigation method applicable to
wildland firefighter entrapments showed the Sequential Timing and Events Plotting
(STEP) method to be the most desirable method, followed very closely by Fault Tree
Analysis. Both methods together met the majority of the goals and objectives of the
thesis. The total overall scores obtained for both the STEP and Fault Tree Analysis
methods showed the two methods are not likely significantly different. Both were rated
higher overall than Control/Barriers Analysis. Each accident investigation method had its
strengths and weaknesses as verified by the resulting evaluations of each criterion.
The STEP method received the highest score and highest number of selected
criteria that evaluators rated highest and in which they concurred. The criteria that the
STEP method rated highest on (realism, comprehensiveness, consistency, and ease of
use) showed this method to be the best investigation process in these areas. Therefore,
overall, the most applicable method would be STEP. Fault Tree Analysis would be the
most desirable method when accident investigators required a systematic process that was
highly visible and easy to implement.

APPLICATIONS
Possible application could involve utilizing each method's strengths in
combination to overcome the inadequacies found with each method. A possible co-
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method approach where STEP is initially used to develop the timeline with actors/actions
and events, identify gaps in knowledge, and provide consistency. Fault Tree Analysis
would then be incorporated to provide the systematic framework to logically sequence
the causal factors, identify any knowledge gaps not uncovered by STEP, and allow for
additional multi-investigator input to be utilized. The resulting analysis obtained from
STEP and Fault Tree Analysis could then be visually displayed using the Fault Tree
diagram to provide an easy to see accident event sequence that would be understandable
and informative. Since both methods were evaluated as easy to use, a co-method
approach could be relatively easy to implement. In addition, this approach could produce
a valuable cross-check and verification approach for each method.
An alternative approach to determining the most appropriate method would be to
conduct investigations using both methods individually under a variety of entrapment
circumstances to actively assess each method's capabilities in causal factor
determination. This would further validate each method's applicability to wildland
firefighting.

FUTURE RESEARCH
It may be desirable to research and develop a new integrated method that
incorporated the strengths of STEP and FTA into a third more comprehensive method.
Thus the weaknesses of each model could be accounted for (and the inherent biases of the
author and subject matter experts) and eliminated to produce a method better suited to the
unique, dynamic work environment of wildland firefighting. Current research into
organizational/managerial and human factors involved in accident causation would need
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to be incorporated into the new model. In order to identify those factors that lie at the root
causes of accidents, an updated model should integrate research that focused on high
reliability organizations (e.g. air traffic control or aircraft carrier operations), decision
making models, risk management concepts (e.g. risk homeostasis), intentional standards
violations, and human error mechanisms (See Rasmussen 1997 for research into these
converging fields). These fields of research could combine various academic and safety
professional disciplines into a singular, encompassing causation model that would more
accurately and effectively reflect more deeply rooted failure mechanisms.
Another alternative would be to investigate more thoroughly the possible
application of Accident Fault Trees (AFT diagrams) to wildland firefighter entrapments.
Love (in press) has extended the capabilities of traditional Fault Tree diagrams to include
temporal properties, accident severity considerations, and possible interactions during the
course of the accident. These enhancements account for the most significant shortfalls
inherent in traditional Fault Tree Analysis.
In hindsight it may be more effective to survey additional evaluators in order to
accumulate more evidence as to the best method. It would be more insightful to have
investigators who are experts with each method investigate entrapment fires and
subsequently compare results.
An additional criterion would also prove more informative in the evaluation. This
criterion could be the practical utility of the method to wildland firefighter entrapments.
This would allow the evaluators to provide input into the overall applicability.

CHAPTER 7
DISCUSSION
Results of this thesis have shown the applicability of specific accident
investigation methods to wildland firefighter entrapments. Subject matter experts have
rated the Fault Tree Analysis and STEP method as the most applicable to this specific
high risk work environment. STEP received the highest overall rating, the largest
number of high rated criteria, and had acceptable evaluator consensus on all criteria
except being systematic(face validity). Fault Tree Analysis was rated nearly as high and
with the exception of being realistic (ecological validity), evaluators reached consensus.
When "ease of use" was eliminated from the evaluation process (to determine whether
that criterion affected the rating), results remained unchanged. Both Fault Tree Analysis
and STEP scored a "9" for ease of use and evaluators acceptably agreed on the score.
Fault Tree Analysis has limitations in representing sequential and simultaneous events
along a time line. It also was limited in only portraying success/failure modes and not the
vaiying degrees that are often the norm in human interactions. But its ability to
systematically and logically solicit the cause of a particular event was its overall strength.
The STEP process was not deemed as sound in that respect. The STEP method was
determined to be a method that was valuable in organizing and collecting data at the
onset of the investigation. It was valuable in its ability to follow actors and events along
the causal chain and illuminate breaks in the sequence. It also illustrated possible
interactions among actors and graphically depicted the accident process in an easy to
follow and updateable format. The STEP method would be a powerful tool in the data
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collection/developmental stage of an investigation. When followed up by a Fault Tree
Analysis, any subsequent questions uncovered may be investigated. This second stage
analysis could also provide validation or invalidation of the STEP procedure. Upon
completion of the accident investigation, the visual display of the root causes,
contributing factors, and chain-of-events would be in the hierarchical tree format used by
Fault Tree Analysis. Any interested party could then see graphically the sequence of
events that have led to the accident. The appropriate and responsible administrators could
then have accurate focus points on which to mitigate hazards and institute corrective
measures. By the application of both methods in concert, latent agency inadequacies,
managerial omissions and oversights, and human factors issues would more likely be
identified than by utilizing a single approach.

INVESTIGATING NEAR MISSES

The premise has been raised as to the critical need to investigate incidents that
have not led to disaster, the near-misses (Lucas 1991, Reason 1991, Vaughan 1996b).
This approach would identify the sequence of events that could have led to a disastrous
result were it not for luck and/or extraordinary recovery efforts. Identification of adaptive
processes, modes of recovery, and conditions at the boundary of near-miss versus
harmful accident situations could be invaluable in proactive measures to prevent future
occurrences. Rasmussen (1997) discussed this point when he said that individual workers
navigate freely within a work system shaped by objectives and constraints
(administrative, functional, safety related). He stated that a worker searches freely within

72

those boundaries "guided by process criteria such as work loads, cost effectiveness, risk
of failure, joy of exploration, etc..Managers supply the "cost gradient" in which a
worker searches to identify an "effort gradient". Therefore, in their search, a worker will
systematically migrate toward the boundary of functionally acceptable performance, and
when crossing the boundaiy is irreversible, an accident may result. In a dynamic work
environment such as firefighting, many degrees of freedom exist where firefighters must
continually validate boundaries and adapt to changes that may be frequent, rapid, and life
threatening. Rasumssen (1990) said that removal of human errors cannot and should not
be the goal of safety programs. He stated that " the ability to explore degrees of freedom
should be supported and means of recovery from the effects of errors should be found."
Through training (such as simulators), firefighters could subsequently learn better coping
skills at critical boundaries and a more effective array of tools in which to successfully
identify, adapt, and successfully recover from potentially hazardous situations. Agencies
continue to add more rules to cover situations where disasters occur in an environment
where all the conditions can never be known (Vaughan 1996b). Skills to avoid
entrapments and assess risk at critical boundaries could provide alternatives to the
addition of more rules that make completion of the job more difficult (Rasmussen 1997).
At the managerial/administrative level, near-miss investigations would aid in locating
those latent factors that may have lain dormant at various levels awaiting triggering
actions that may result in an accident. Defenses, barriers, and safeguards within an
organization can be circumvented when a particular combination of events occurs.
Proactive identification of possible "loopholes" within the organization could aid in
closing those gaps in the defenses through which accident sequences may occur.
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The reporting, identification and subsequent investigation of near-miss incidents
is the primary focus of the National Interagency Fire Center's (NIFC) SAFETYNET '99
pilot program. This program responds to the Tri-Data report's recommendation (1998) to
develop a system for anonymously reporting safety concerns. Another interagency
response to Tri-Data's recommendations is the Center for Lessons Learned that is
currently being developed at NIFC. This Center is a focal point and clearinghouse for
information related to firefighter safety. Both the safety data reporting system and the
Center for Lessons Learned are vital components of the study's principle "collect reliable
safety data and use it".
Lucas (1991) proposed "systemic safety management" whereby perceived
potential problems, as well as near misses and accidents, are actively solicited from
throughout the organization as an integral component of the organizational culture. She
cited three key elements vital to the success of a systems approach. The employees must
have anonymity and freedom from prosecution in reporting near misses. They must have
confidence in management's policy of forgiveness so they have no fear in losing their
jobs. And finally, there must be feedback to employees in the form of implemented error
control strategies so that they can see the results of their input. Thus, it is critical that
organizations objectively evaluate their underlying safety culture if they wish to institute
a near miss reporting system and benefit from the results.
In addition, by reducing the number of unsafe acts, agencies can reduce the
number of harmful accidents. For every accident reported, there are numerous unsafe
acts that were unreported (Reason 1991). This reduction of unsafe acts could be
accomplished by clearly defining employee (firefighter) tasks, adequately teach them
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how to do each task, validly measure performance of each task, and subsequently reward
workers for high-quality completion of the assigned tasks (Kenney 1993). This is clearly
a line management responsibility and function. These include, but are not limited to,
safety, environmental, and risk management activities. Acquisition and allocation of
resources, proper training, and stewardship programs are subsequently dependent on the
decisions of top level managers and administrators (Vaughan 1996b, Kenney 1993).
Another avenue of approach that can add more reliability and validity to accident
investigations is one in which the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has a
prominent role. As Johnson (1999) points out, the NTSB position is outside the Federal
regulatory mechanisms that protect the agencies and companies that are investigated.
Thus the Board has the independence and autonomy to analyze managerial and regulatory
practices that may otherwise be overlooked. Any agency that investigates itself may very
well be suspect in its conclusions (whether right or wrong), particularly when the agency
itself may be lacking in adequate policy, regulations/standards, and oversight. As in
previous wildland firefighter accident investigations, wider issues pertaining to
organizational and administrative practices have been generally obscured by more
prominent causal factors such as high workload, situational awareness, distributed
cognition, and mode confusion (Johnson 1999).
As environmental conditions change adversely, fire ground complexities increase,
and agencies continue to be subject to changing political climates, a comprehensive,
systematic process to reveal possible failure points is vital. Investigations of entrapment
near-misses would provide the insight as to where the system needs reassessment and
updated controls. It would likewise provide insight into the adaptive/coping skills that
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may have kept a near-miss from becoming an accident. There is a need to learn from the
lessons that occur without the resulting disaster so that firefighter safety is not so much
reactive to major disasters but continually adapting to the dynamic nature of the overall
work environment. Reason (1997) calls for an informed culture, one comprised of a
reporting culture (accident/incident reporting), a just culture (where rewards and
punishments are viewed as just), à flexible culture (where an organization shifts from a
bureaucratic conventional operating mode to professional, task expert control during
emergency situations), and finally a learning culture (where the organization has the
willingness and competence to identify correct conclusions and implement needed
reforms). Adequate investigations of near-miss incidents and the development of
avoidance/coping skills at vital trigger points (boundaries) could greatly decrease the
harmful outcomes to wildland firefighters. By identification of boundaries where
successful recovery actions cannot be implemented and the necessary coping/recovery
skills near these boundaries, harmful accidents could be significantly reduced. The STEP
method used as a primary investigation tool and followed up by Fault Tree Analysis
could greatly aid in the ongoing search for a safer firefighting work environment. Both
methods offer the means to incorporate more abstract causative factors and more specific
root causes as new "composite" error identification models become functional.
This thesis showed, not only the two most applicable accident investigation
methods for wildland firefighter entrapments, but the critical need for requiring a method
to be utilized. In order to determine the proximate causes of entrapments, the trends, and
monitoring of safety measures, it seems equally critical to develop the data base of
human factors causes and near miss incidents. To develop and institute a safety culture

76

through a learning culture, a total commitment by management must be a leading
priority. The current trend in firefighter entrapments can only be reduced by top level
administrative support and low level firefighter dedication to safety A change in the way
we do business, a change in the safety culture, can be and must be achieved by the
combined efforts of all levels of the wildland firefighter community.
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Figure A. 1

GENERAL OVERVIEW FOR EVALUATORS

Enclosed;
1.

Overviews of each accident investigation method a) Fault Tree Analysis, b) Control/Barrier Analysis,
c) STEP (Sequential Timing and Events Plotting).
2. Results of the South Canyon case study analysis using the three methods. If the results seem
incomplete and need something added, let me know.. .1 may have missed something in the analysis as I
have had no one look it over. That doesn't necessarily mean the analysis method is faulty, just my
work to produce the results!
3. Study Approach copy with the evaluation criteria and rating procedures. Rate each method using the 6
criteria (ranges 0 to 2). Therefore a method that hilly meets each criteria would have an overall rating
of 12. The study approach has a brief history of the fire, the criteria and procedures I used and the
scientific justification for using the case study approach (This part isn't necessary to read to do the
evaluation). Enclose any additional comments or suggestions that may be helpful. Also if at any time
there are questions about any area, call or e-mail me at the following;
Steve Munson
508 S. 3"^ W. #9
Missoula, MT. 59801
406-5423877
smunson @bi^skv.net
INSTRUCTIONS:
Each criterion will have to be evaluated as to how it would apply to field investigations of wildland
firefighter entrapments. Therefore, for example, for criteria #4(consistency), you need to assess if this
method is repeatable if someone else had the same information, did it seem to be a logical method to
determine all the causal factors involved? Remember that you are to evaluate each accident investigation
method, not how well I did it, but what each method reveals as tar as contributing and causal factors. If one
method does not look deep enough into a cause, then it may not be comprehensive enough, (but that
method may be able to do that I just didn't pursue it far enough) that's my fault not the methods.
Please return your results as soon as possible. All this needs to be is the number assigned to each
criteria (i.e. Realistic-1, comprehensive-2) for each method...STEP, Fault Tree, and Control/Barriers. Also
enclose any comments and suggestions you may have that would aid in making the study or technique(s)
better.
GENERAL COMMENTS ON EACH METHOD:
Fault Tree Analysis—the top event is the undesired happening (getting burned over) work down
the tree in steps to determine what caused the event above it. If two or more events are required then an
''and" gate is required. If only one of a list of events is required then an "or" gate is necessary. Keep
working down until you found the root cause or you don't have the information to go any farther.
Control/Barriers Analysis—There are always barriers to protect us fi-om harm. When one or more
fail then an accident can occur. These barriers can be physical (PPE) or administrative (Rules, guidelines,
etc...) The idea is to define the barriers that protect firefighters from getting burned over, then assess which
ones failed.
STEP- The idea is to reproduce the accident sequence as a mental motion picture. You use blocks
that define actors and their actions that together or alone interacted to produce an accident. Actors can be
people or things (Fire is an actor). You place these blocks along a timeline to determine gaps, the accident
flow, and the interaction between actors (and their actions). This gives a visual means to reproduce the
accident and what caused what to happen and when. In this study an Excel worksheet was used to show all
information available and the relevant actors along a timeline. The blocks were taken from that worksheet
to produce a flow diagram that shows how the accident process occurred.
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Figure A.2

FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
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TABLE A. 1

Barriers Worksheet
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Figure A. 3

STEP WORKSHEETS
The following pages are the STEP development worksheets. They were constructed in a
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet program and are made up of STEP building blocks (see
Figures 13-14) along a timeline on the X (horizontal) axis. The Y (vertical) axis lists the
actors (people, objects, things) in the accident sequence. These worksheets are placed so
that they are read across to the final outcome and then drop down and read across again.
The sources of information were abbreviated due to limited space. They are 1) FBA is for
the fire behavior analysis done by Butler and others (1998) which includes Ted Putnam's
time estimations, 2) SCR is for the original South Canyon Report (IMRT 1994, 1995),
and
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when water
drops effective.

14:45:00

15:00:00

SCR

"Fire"
"Fire" activity
increases...Smoke burning as
low in
hot spots in
double
canyon.Wind
increases on Main
draws.
Ridge

Scholz-

-Scholz,
Shepard-

"Wind" blows strong "Wind" increases
and gusty at Canyon on Main
Ridge...fire activity
Cr.
Estates(1Smph)...front increases
approaches

-ScholzSCR"West Flank
Group"
"West Flank Group"
meets at
eats lunch with
Stump...first Jumpers at Lunch
time together Spot
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15:15:00

15:20:00 15:23:00

15:30:00

15:45:00

15:55:00

15:56:00

15:58:00

-Petrilli,
Longanecker

SCR
"Fire" activity
picl<s up west
of
H1...reported
by helibase

"Fire" activity
continues
SCR,
south of
Scholz,Erickson,Doehring Double
Draws
"Fire" burning in litter...

-SCR"Wind"
squirrely at
H-2...light
at Zero Pt.
Cold Front
approaches

Scholz"Wind" blows strong on
Main Ridge...calm on
West flank...picks up on
Lunch Spot...sun breaks
through

Ryerson,Good,Shepard
photo"Wind" blows at SSmph
on Main Ridge and
South of Lunch
Spot...Calm on West
flank

Erickson.Doehring
"Wind" calm on west flank

-Good"Spot fires"
burning in
bottom of
West
drainage
Good"Spot fires"
burning in
Dottom of
West
drainage
-FBA"West Flank Group"
working between 1450ft
and 1880ft from Zero Pt.
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16:07:00
16:06:0()
16:05:00
16:04:00
Erickson.HipkeHipke,time:PutnamPetrilli,Thomas,Shepard(3ood,RyersonDoehring,Erickson,Brixey, "Fire" active in bottom of
"Fire" runs up east facing
West drainage south and
''Fire" intensity
Haugh-SCR"Fire" on west bench
slope in West
below Lunch Spot.
1ncreases
"Fire" crosses west "Fire" moving north up
north of Lunch spot."U"
drainage...moving north.
drainage at base of drainage
shaped front up both
gully below
sides of drainage
Longanecker

16:00:00

-ScholzWind" blows from
west at 45 mph

16:02:00

Good.RyersonWind" blows from
«est
@45 mph
()n Main ridge

-Petrilli"Wind" blows at
35mph below Lunch Spot.
Petrilli radios Mackey that
fire has crossed main
canyon.
-Petrilli"Spot fire (1)" runs on Eastfacing slope...35 yds. North
of Double Draws

-Shepard.Scholz"Spot Fire(2)" starts
across West drainage
below West Flank Group.
Reported by Kelso...Schoiz
"things are getting complicate J"

Shepard.Scholz"West Flank Group" told by
Shepard to "get out"
1880 ft. from Zero Pt.
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16:11:15

16:12:00

16:12:30

16:12:15

Time:PutnamTime:Putnam -FBA-

Scholz-

"Fire" roars up to Main ridge
south of Spur Ridge

TIME:Putnam FBA-

Erickson,Haugh,Scholz,Robertson-

Erickson,Archuleta,Time:Putnam"Fire" burns to base of "Fire" on south side of
spur ridge about to enter Spur Ridge crests Main
draw below "tree"
ridge 150-200ft. South of
Zero Pt.

16:13:30

"Fire" crests spur ridge
hot air, heat ©Zero Pt.

"Fire" burns over
West Flank Group
200-280 ft. from
Zero Pt.
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Time: Putnam

-FBA-

"West Flank Group" stops
@200ft. From Zero Pt.
Leaders
Thrash&Roth Depoy
Shelters

Time: Putnam FBA"West Flank
Group" overrun by
fire 200-280ft.
from Zero Pt.
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16:14:00

16:13:45

16:15:00

Time:Putnam"Fire" overruns Blecha at 121
ft. from Zero Pt.

Hipke, time:Putnam"Fire" just about at Zero Pt. Hot air pushes
down Hipke 15ft. From Zero Pt.

Navarro,Scholz Byers.Ryerson,
time:Putnam"Fire" near top of Main Ridge at H-2
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TIME

300:00:00

5:28:00

08:00 to 09:00

-SCR-

9:30:00

10:27:00

-SCR-

"Blanco" with BLM/FS crew at "Blanco" with Mackey,Tyler,
Main ridge, begin making H- and 93R recpns fire. Mackey
calls jumpers on ground and
2. Discusses strategy with
Mackey. Listens to NOAA
instructs to build line down
forecast with some jumpers. West flank.
BLANCO
Erickson.SCR-

ERICKSON

-Erickson,SCR,FBA"Erickson" went to get gear at
jump spot.
"Erickson" "thought it looked
ugly down in there" when told
to start digging line downhill
-Rhoades,OSHA"Rhodes" questions downhill line
construction...Jumper'(2) load
dropping

RHOADES
-SCR-

JUMPERSd)

-Rhoades.OSHA"Jumpers" talk about whole
drainage burning out, move
to jump site to gather gear.

"Jumpers{1)" questions
downhill line construction
and requests discussion with
Mackey...smoke low in west
drainage
-SCR"Jumpers(2)" of 8 arrive...little
wind...fire at 127 acres

JUMPERS(2)
PRINEVILLE IHC(9)
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16:04:00 16:05:00

16:06:00 16:07:00 16:08:00

16:08:30 16:08:40 16:10:00

16:10:30

Doehring,Erickson,
Brixley, HaughScholz.Gray, SCR"Blanco" relays
message about
Spot fire across
West drainage to
Ryerson, Mackey

Erickson.Doehring"Erickson" with
Doehring meet
Archulta on west
flank about
450ft.and hear
order to get out

"Blanco" called by
Haugh about Spot
fire(2) across West
drainage...says
"get out"

Erickson,Doehring,
Haugh, BrixeyHaugh,Erickson,time:Putnam"Erickson"
Doehring,
Archuleta at
Tree...meet
Haugh,Brixev,,.

"Erickson"sees first of West
Flank group crossing top of
Spur Ridge. At Tree with
Haugh

FBA:Time:Putnam
"Erickson" at Tree,
sees West Flank
Group as they cross
Spur Ridge...yells at
Group to go faster,
calls Mackey about
spot fire(2) below
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16:10:45

16:11:00

16:11:15 16:12:00 16:12:15 16:12:30

16:13:30

16:13:45

16:14:00 16:15.00

SCR.FBA"Blanco" radios
Dispatch and says
they are losing fire on
side near homes(east
side of west
drainage)...requests
retardent.

Erickson,Archuleta
Time:Putnam"Erickson" with
Haugh start up
fireline...Hipke at
325ft. From Zero
Pt.
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TIME

3:00:00

5:28:00

08:00 to 09:00

9:30:00

10:27:00

11:15:00

11:30:00

11:35:00

PRINEVIL LE IHC CREW

-SCR-SCR"Mackey"
request
Helicopter
and fixed
wing aircraft.
MACKEY

"Mackey" takes
recon flight in
93R with
Blanco, Tyler.
Tells
Jumpers(1) to
dig line down
West flank

102

12:30:00

12:45:00

13:00:00

-OSHA.Haugh"Prineville" briefed
on weather, frontal
passage at
helibase?

14:15 to
13:30:00
14:00 PM 14:30 14:45:00 15:00:00 15:10:00
PM

15:15:00

15:20:00

-SCR"Prineville"(2n
d group)
arrive at H2..works on
Main
ridge...Longa
necker leaves
Lunch spot to
scout line to
South
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12:30:00

12:45:00

13:00:00

-OSHA.Haugh"Prineville" briefed
on weather, frontal
Dassage at
helibase?

14:15 to
13:30:00
PM
14:00 PM 14:30 14:45:00 15:00:00 15:10:00

15:15:00

15:20:00

-SCR"Prinevllle"(2n
d group)
arrive at H2..works on
Main
ridge...Longa
necker leaves
Lunch spot to
scout line to
South
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15:23:00

15:30:00

16:04:00 16:05:00

16:02:00

15:45:00 15:55:00 15:56:00 15:58:00 16:00:00

-SCR"Prineville"on
main ridge
directed to go to
H-1 to safety
zone.

PetrilliSCR,Erickson,Doehring_
"Mackey" sends
Erickson.Doehring to
hotspot Main ridge

"Mackey" called
by Petrilli to
report fire is
35yds north of
base of Double
Draws.
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16:06:00

16:07:00

16:08:00

16:08:30

16:08:40 16:10:00

16:10:30 16:10:45 16:11:00 16:11:15 16:12:00

-Petrilli,
Thomas,Shep
ard"Mackey"
meets
Jumpers(2)
10Oft. Below
Lunch
Spot,says to
go up to H-1.
Calls
Longanecker
ko check up.

EricksonLonganecker,ti
me:Putnam-

SCRTime:Putnam-

"Mackey"
moves north
toward West
Flank Group
after radioing
Longanecker.

"Mackey" begins
running north
along West flank
fireline at 1450ft.

"Mackey"
catches up
with West
Flank Group.

"Mackey"
called by
Erickson
about spot
fie below
them
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16:12:15

16:12:30

16:13:30

16:14:00

16:15:00

Note: "Prineville IHC (9)" and "Mackey" during these time frames were in the process of being overtaken by the
fire.
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15:30:00 to 16:04 SCR
Wind blows up to 35mph on Main
Ridge

13:00:00
11:15:00 to 11:35:00
PetrilIi,Doehring

09:30:00

Jumpers (1)
assemble
gear at jump
site... talk
about entire
drainage
burning out

Jumpers(l,2) question
tactics
Blanco w/Mackey recon •
fire and instruct
Jumpers(2)to build
fireline down West flank
as thev arrive

11:30:00

16:00:00

SCR

Fire flares up at a tree
-• Fire crosses West drainage

Fire torches a "Tree"
40yds. Below Main Ridge
with 5ft. wide run through
oak.

0800-0900
Rhoades,OS
HA

SCR

Firefighters retreat 400ft. but return
when water drops effective, Cut
tree becomes "Stump"

SCR

13:30:00

At base of gully below
Longanecker

Scholz

14:00:00 to
16:04:00
SCR

SCR
Jumpers(l,2) start digging
fireline down West
flank.. .discuss pulling off at
11:35 after torched tree.
12:30:00

SCR

West Flank Group meets
at "Stump"
First time all together
Prineville(9) joins
Jumpers(l,2)

West Flank Group
working between
1440 ft, and 1880 ft.
fi-om Zero Ft. Group
east lunch at 1400 at
Lunch Spot.

Prineville(9) arrive at H-2,
sent by Blanco and Shepard
down West Flank.

Figure A.4 and Part 1 of final STEP Worksheet of South Canyon Fire accident sequence beginning at 0800 on July 6, 1994. Jumpers(l) are
the first group of smokejumpers to arrive, Jumpers(2) the second. Zero Pt. is the location on the Main Ridge at the north end of the West
Flank fireline where escape from the fire was possible. References to locations are defined in Appendix D and Butler and others (1998).
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16:02:00

16:12:30(Putnam)
Erickson,Haugh,Scholz,Robertson

16:12:15(Putnam) FBA

Doehring,Erickson,Brixey,Ha
ugh

Fire crests Main Ridge
Fire crests Spur Ridge

Fire moves north up
drainage,Petrilli radios
Mackey that fire crossed
drainage

South of Spur Ridge 150-200ft. from
Zero Pt.

Hot air and heat at Zero Pt.

16:04:00
Shepard,Scholz
West Flank
Group
ordered by Shepard
to "get out"
1880ft. from
Zero Pt.

16:10:30(Putnam)
Erickson,FBA
•
West Flank
Group (Mackey) radioed by
Erickson about spot fire
below them.
No response

16:02:00

Petrilli

Wind blows at 35
below Lunch Spot

16:12:15(Putnam)
FBA

West Flank Group
Stops at 200ft.
from Zero Pt.
Leaders Thrash
and Roth
deploy fire
shelters

16:13:30(Putnam)
FBA

West Flank
Group
Fatally Burned
By Fire
200-280ft. from
Tern Pf

16:08:40
SCR
Mackey joins West Flank Group
Ran at 16:07 from Lunch Spot after
meeting jumpers(l). Directs them
to upper safety zone

Part 2 of final STEP Worksheet showing continuation of South Canyon Fire accident sequence. (OSHA 1995, IMRT 1994, Butler and
others 1998). Refer to Figure# for map of fire and relative locations of actors.

APPENDIX B

USDA Forest Service
Documents

Table B.l NWCG 10 Standard Firefighting Orders, 18 Watch-Out Situations, and 10 DownhiMndirect
Line Construction Guidelines.

STANDARD FIRE FIGHTING ORDERS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

FIGHT FIRE AGGRESSIVELY BUT PROVIDE FOR SAFETY HRST.
INITIATE ALL ACTIONS BASED ON CURRENT AND EXPECTED FIRE BEHAVIOR.
RECOGNIZE CURRENT WEATHER CONDITIONS AND OBTAIN FORECASTS.
ENSURE INSTRUCTIONS ARE GIVEN AND UNDERSTOOD.
OBTAIN CURRENT INFORMATION ON HRE STATUS.
REMAIN IN COMMUNICATION WITH CREW MEMBERS, YOUR SUPERVISOR, AND
ADJOINING FORCES.
7. DETERMINE SAFETY ZONES AND ESCAPE ROUTES.
8. ESTABLISH LOOKOUTS IN POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS SITUATIONS.
9. RETAIN CONTROL AT ALL TIMES.
10. STAY ALERT, KEEP CALM, THINK CLEARLY, ACT DECISIVELY.

18 SITUATIONS THAT SHOUT WATCH-OUT
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

FIRE NOT SCOUTED OR SIZED UP.
IN COUNTRY NOT SEEN IN DAYLIGHT.
SAFETY ZONES AND ESCAPE ROUTES NOT IDENTIFIED.
UNFAMILL\R WITH WEATHER AND LOCAL FACTORS INFLUENCING FIRE BEHAVIOR.
UNIFORMED ON STRATEGY, TACTICS, AND HAZARDS.
INSTRUCTIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS NOT CLEAR.
NO COMMUNICATION LINK WITH CREW MEMBERS/SUPERVISOR.
CONSTRUCTING FIRELINE WITHOUT SAFE ANCHOR POINT.
BUILDING FIRELINE DOWNHILL WITH FIRE BELOW.
ATTEMPTING FRONTAL ASSAULT ON FIRE.
UNBURNED FUEL BETWEEN YOU AND THE HRE.
CANNOT SEE MAIN HRE, NOT IN CONTACT WITH ANYONE WHO CAN.
ON A HILLSIDE WHERE ROLLING MATERL\L CAN IGNITE FUEL BELOW.
WEATHER IS GETTING HOTTER AND DRIER.
WIND INCREASES AMD/OR CHANGES DIRECTION.
GETTING FREQUENT SPOT HRES ACROSS LINE.
TERRAIN AND FUELS MAKE ESCAPE TO SAFETY ZONES DIFFICULT.
TAKING A NAP NEAR THE FIRELINE.

DOWNHILL/INDIRECT LINE CONSTRUCTION GUIDELINES
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.

THE DECISION IS MADE BY A COMPETENT RREFIGHTER AFTER THOROUGH
SCOUTING.
DOWNHILL LINE CONSTRUCTION SHOULD NOT BE ATTEMPTED WHEN FIRE IS
PRESENT DIRECTLY BELOW THE PROPOSED STARTING POINT.
THE FIRELINE SHOULD NOT BE IN OR ADJACENT TO A CHIMNEY OR CHUTE THAT
COULD BURN OUT WHILE THE CREW IS IN THE VICINITY.
COMMUNICATIONS IS ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE CREW WORKING DOWNHILL AND
CREWS WORKING TOWARD THEM FROM BELOW. WHEN NEITHER CREW CAN
ADEQUATELY OBSERVE THE FIRE, COMMUNICATIONS WILL BE ESTABLISHED
BETWEEN THE CREWS, SUPERVISING OVERHEAD, AND A LOOKOUT POSTED WHERE
THE HRE'S BEHAVIOR CAN BE CONTINUOUSLY OBSERVED.
THE CREW WILL BE ABLE TO RAPIDLY REACH A ZONE OF SAFETY FROM ANY POINT
ALONG THE LINE IF THE FIRE UNEXPECTEDLY CROSSES BELOW THEM.

Ill

6. A DOWNHILL LINE SHOULD BE SECURELY ANCHORED AT THE TOP. AVOID
UNDERSLUNG LINE IF AT ALL PRACTICAL.
7. LINE FIRING SHOULD BE DONE AS THE LINE PROGRESSES, BEGINNING FROM THE
ANCHOR POINT AT THE TOP. THE BURNED OUT AREA PROVIDES A CONTINUOUS
SAFETY ZONE FOR THE CREW AND REDUCES THE LIKELIHOOD OF FIRE CROSSING THE
LINE.
8.
BE AWARE OF AND AVOID THE "18" SITUATIONS THAT SHOUT WATCH OUT!"
9.
FULL COMPLIANCE WITH "THE 10 STANDARD HRE ORDERS" IS ASSURED.

SOURCE: FIRELINE HANDBOOK PMS 410-01, NATIONAL WILDFIRE COORDINATING
GROUP. NFES 0065.
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Table B.2. NWCG Wildland Firefighter Entrapment Matrix.

ENTRAPMENT INVESTIGATION EUEMENT MATRIX

L

FIRE BEHAVIOR
Fuels
Weadier
Topography
Predicied vs. Observed

IL ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
Smoke
Heat
Other

m. INCIDENT MANAGEMENT
Incident Objectives
Stmegy
Tactics
Safety Bnefiniip/Majta: Coxiceras
Addzessed
IV. CONTROL MECHANISMS
Span of Contnl
CoTnTniinicatioas
Ongoii^ Evaluadois
"10 Standard File Oxdeis/18 WatdiOHt Situations.''

V. INVOLVED PERSONNEL PROFH-ES
Traiaiag^QiiaiillcaiiflTK/Physical Fitness
Opeiatioiial Peziod Leagth/Fatigae
Attitudes
Leadership
Experience Levels

1
j
i

VI. EQUIPMENT
Availability
PcrAmnance

* Element items must be supported with wriaea docuttaauation.

n
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